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Abstract 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is a therapeutic approach that emphasizes the 
alteration of the relationship one has towards one’s thoughts, rather than attempting to 
change the content of thoughts. It seeks to promote the awareness of thinking as an 
ongoing relational process through cognitive defusion techniques. The verbal repetition 
of thoughts is a technique that has recently been shown in a single-case alternating 
treatment designs study to significantly reduce the believability and distress associated 
with self-relevant negative thoughts (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). The 
present study compared the effects of verbal repetition with brief imaginal exposure and 
no intervention in reducing the believability, distress, and meaningfulness associated with 
contamination-related thoughts. Individuals with high levels of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms identified three distressing contamination-related thoughts and made ratings of 
belief, distress, and meaningfulness for each thougt, using 100-mm visual analogue 
scales. They were then randomly assigned to receive v rbal repetition, imaginal exposure, 
or no intervention, after which they completed ratings at post-intervention and one-week 
follow-up. Participants also completed a category membership decision task to determine 
whether verbal repetition and/or imaginal exposure produces semantic satiation, a 
temporary loss of the literal meaning of words. Signif cant reductions in belief, distress, 
and meaningfulness were observed following verbal repetition at post-intervention and 
there was some maintenance of these gains one week lat r. In contrast, no significant 
reductions were observed at post-intervention following either imaginal exposure or no 
intervention. However, significant reductions in ratings of belief and distress were 
observed one week later following imaginal exposure. A semantic satiation effect was 
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observed for only verbal repetition, and although there was no evidence that this effect 
was associated with reductions in appraisal ratings at post-intervention, there was some 
indication of a relationship with follow-up appraisl ratings. Implications of these 
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We experience a stream of continuous thoughts during each and every waking 
day. Some thoughts appear to emerge spontaneously whereas others are more deliberate 
and consciously evoked and elaborated. We also have t e ability to think about, and make 
interpretations and appraisals of these thoughts, a process termed metacognition (i.e., 
thinking about thinking, or cognition about cognition – e.g., Nelson, 1992). When 
individuals interpret their ongoing stream of thoughts, some thoughts are appraised as 
“neutral”, some are appraised as “positive”, whereas others are experienced as unwanted 
and appraised as “negative”. The occurrence of, and belief in, the myriad “negative” 
thoughts we experience can be a source of suffering for people and lead to problems with 
anxiety. Cognitive models of anxiety propose that problems with anxiety result from 
erroneous beliefs about the dangerousness of certain thoughts, as well as erroneous 
beliefs about the dangerousness of certain feelings, physical sensations, and/or external 
situations (e.g., Barlow, 1988; Beck, Emery, & Greenb rg, 1985).  
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is an anxiety disor er in which erroneous 
beliefs about thoughts are implicated as playing a central role in its development and 
persistence (e.g., Rachman, 1997, 1998). OCD is chara terized by recurrent intrusive 
thoughts, images, or impulses, and/or compulsive behaviours or mental acts designed to 
reduce anxiety or distress (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Obsessions are 
viewed as extreme forms of normal intrusive thoughts, which are defined as “repetitive, 
upsetting, unwanted thoughts, images or impulses of internal origin that suddenly appear 
in consciousness and are considered irrational, unrealistic, foreign to one’s character, and 
difficult to control” (Purdon & Clark, 1993, p. 715). Between 80-99% of the general 
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population experience unwanted, intrusive thoughts whose content and nature is 
experienced as distressing (Purdon & Clark, 1993, Rachman & de Silva, 1978; 
Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984), and such intrusive thoughts have been found to be similar 
in content to the obsessions that characterize OCD (e.g., Purdon & Clark, 1993; Rachman 
& de Silva, 1978; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980).   
Cognitive-behavioural models of OCD assert that intrusive thoughts become 
problematic and develop into clinically significant obsessions when they are erroneously 
appraised as meaningful, potentially harmful to self or others, and/or when they evoke a 
sense of responsibility for preventing the perceived harm portended by the thoughts 
(Rachman, 1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1989). For example, a new mother with OCD may 
experience intrusive thoughts that she could sexually abuse her infant son. While 
changing his diaper or bathing him, she may wonder if she feels sexually aroused. This 
doubt may become so frequent and troubling that she avoids bathing or changing her son, 
and relies on her husband to do so. This appraisal of the intrusive thought as potentially 
being true is associated with worry about the meaning of thought recurrences and 
concomitant changes in mood (e.g., Purdon, 2001; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994). This 
in turn is said to influence the individual’s ability to control the obsessive thoughts, and 
evokes the use of compulsive rituals designed to neutralize the thought and/or ameliorate 
the distress it causes (Purdon, 2001; Sutherland, Newman, & Rachman, 1982). In the 
above example, the mother may unsuccessfully attemp to suppress any thoughts that she 
will abuse her son, and she may begin to excessively ask her husband for reassurance that 
she would not harm their child.   
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Cognitive-behavioural models of OCD consider the negative and erroneous 
appraisal of the meaning and significance of intrusive thoughts to be a key factor in the 
development and persistence of OCD (e.g., Rachman, 1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1989). As 
such, interventions that seek to change the relationship one has towards his or her 
obsessive thoughts, and thinking in general (i.e., changes in metacognitive processes), 
should be effective in altering the belief in these thoughts, leading to successful treatment 
of OCD. 
The most effective psychological treatment of OCD to date is exposure and 
response prevention (e.g., Foa, Franklin, & Kozak, 1998), in which people expose 
themselves to their obsessions while refraining from compulsive acts. Exposure and 
response prevention is thought to produce habituation, a natural decrease in anxiety, 
which allows for extinction of the aversive emotional response to the obsession, making 
the compulsive act unnecessary. Exposure and response prevention has been found to be 
at least as effective as, and in many cases superior to, pharmacological approaches to the 
treatment of OCD (Foa & Kozak, 1996). For example, findings from the National 
Institute of Mental Health-sponsored collaborative study of clomipramine and behaviour 
therapy found exposure and response prevention to be superior to pharmacotherapy at 
both posttreatment and 3-month follow-up (Kozak, Liebowitz, & Foa, 2000). A review of 
behaviour therapy and pharmacotherapy for OCD concluded that exposure and response 
prevention is associated with higher improvement rates t posttreatment, and that dropout 
and refusal rates are higher for medication than exposure and response prevention 
(Stanley & Turner, 1995).   
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Despite the reported efficacy rates for exposure and response prevention in the 
treatment of OCD, there is still between a 20-30% dropout and refusal rate reported for 
exposure and response prevention (Stanley & Turner, 1995). When these factors, as well 
as non-response rates, are taken into account, exposure and response prevention treatment 
may be an effective treatment for only about 50% of individuals with OCD (Salkovskis & 
Westbrook, 1989). In attempting to uncover the reasons for this high rate of dropout and 
treatment refusal, it has been suggested that a keypredictor of exposure and response 
prevention treatment refusal is the fear of exposure and response prevention itself (Foa, 
Steketee, Grayson, & Doppelt, 1983; Maltby & Tolin, 2003). Exposure and response 
prevention requires individuals with OCD to directly face the situations and objects that 
elicit heightened anxiety and avoidance. It is argued that cognitive interventions may be 
helpful both in reappraising the erroneous beliefs as ociated with OCD symptoms and in 
reducing the meaning attached to obsessive thoughts (Purdon, in press; Salkovskis, 1985, 
Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997), thereby reducing the fear associated with exposure and 
response prevention. 
Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for OCD involves the addition of cognitive 
restructuring techniques to the existing exposure and response prevention intervention, in 
order to help teach individuals to correct the malad ptive appraisals that maintain OCD. 
However, the addition of cognitive therapy to exposure-based treatment has, in general, 
not led to significantly improved treatment efficacy (Foa & Franklin, 2001). Vogel, 
Stiles, & Gotestam (2004) compared exposure and response prevention treatment with 
and without cognitive therapy interventions designed to increase motivation for the 
completion of exposure exercises. They found that te addition of cognitive therapy to 
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exposure and response prevention treatment resulted in f wer OCD patients discontinuing 
treatment at some point during the study than exposure and response prevention plus 
relaxation training [6% (n =1) versus 37% (n = 7), respectively]. However, treatment 
outcome was not significantly improved compared to exposure and response prevention 
without cognitive therapy, for both the “intention to treat” analyses and the “completer” 
analyses. In addition, other studies have not found a significantly lower dropout rate 
associated with cognitive therapy (Cottraux et al., 2001; van Oppen et al., 1995). It 
appears that cognitive therapy, either alone or combined with exposure and response 
prevention, is no more effective than exposure and response prevention alone (e.g., 
Abramowitz, Taylor, & McKay, 2005; McLean et al., 2001; for a review, see Foa & 
Franklin, 2001). As such, alternative or modified approaches are needed to more 
effectively treat those individuals with OCD who are not currently helped by existing 
treatments.   
Over the past decade there has been a proliferation of acceptance-based and 
mindfulness-based therapeutic approaches, including Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (Hayes et al., 1999), Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (Linehan, 1993), 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), and Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 200). In contrast to traditional CBT, 
these approaches all have as a therapeutic emphasis t e alteration of the relationship that 
an individual has towards their thoughts (metacognitive beliefs), rather than directly 
attempting to change the form or content of thinking. Thoughts are not so much evaluated 
as “realistic” or “unrealistic,” as is typical of traditional CBT; instead, the therapeutic 
 6 
emphasis is on helping individuals to see all thoughts, including negative or unwanted 
thoughts, as just thoughts – no more, no less (Hayes et al., 1999). 
There is recent preliminary evidence that the addition of a metacognitive rationale 
to exposure and response prevention results in greater reductions in anxiety and distress, 
metacognitive beliefs, and the urge to engage in compulsive rituals, than does exposure 
and response prevention with a habituation rationale (Fisher & Wells, 2005). This 
research finding lends support to the idea that interventions which address metacognitive 
processes (i.e., how obsessive thoughts are thought about) will be helpful in increasing 
OCD treatment efficacy.  
In addition to the above evidence supporting a metacognitive approach to the 
treatment of OCD, a recent uncontrolled study (Twohig, Hayes, & Masuda, 2006) 
suggests that Acceptance and Commitment Therapy may be  potentially efficacious 
treatment for OCD. Using a multiple-baseline, across-participants design, four 
individuals with a primary diagnosis of OCD received eight sessions of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy. At the end of treatment, all participants reported clinically 
significant reductions in compulsive behaviour, and these gains were maintained at three-
month follow-up. In addition, all participants rated the treatment as highly acceptable. 
However, controlled research needs to be conducted prior to the arrival of any firm 
conclusions. In addition, there has been no research comparing an Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy intervention with CBT or exposure and response prevention in the 
treatment of OCD, so it is not known whether Acceptance and Commitment Therapy will 
be able to improve upon existing treatment efficacy rates. 
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is a therapeutic approach which takes the 
view that language processes are at the core of many psychological disorders. It uses 
acceptance and mindfulness processes, along with a commitment to behaving in ways 
which lead to the realization of valued goals, in order to promote greater psychological 
flexibility. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is based on Relational Frame Theory 
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), a line of basic behavioural research on human 
language and cognition which has emerged from a pragmatic philosophical tradition 
termed functional contextualism. Relational Frame Theory posits that thoughts acquire 
their literal meaning and much of their emotional and behavioural regulatory functions 
because the social/verbal community establishes a context in which verbal symbols relate 
mutually to other events and have functions based on these relations. Cognitive fusion is 
the term developed by Hayes and colleagues to describ  how verbal symbols become 
“fused” together with the events they describe, and how the some of the functional 
properties of the event can become present with the emergence of the symbol without a 
full realization that the event has not actually taken place:  
     Cognitive fusion refers to the human tendency to interact with events on the basis of    
     their verbally ascribed functions rather than their direct functions, while being  
     oblivious to the ongoing relational framing that establishes these functions. The event  
     and one’s thinking about it become so fused as to be inseparable and that creates the  
     impression that verbal construal is not present at all (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting,  
     Twohig, & Wilson, 2004, p. 25).   
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In a real-life example of the effects of cognitive fusion, Luoma and Hayes (2003) 
describe what happens when an individual thinks about a lemon, when no lemon is 
actually present: 
     When we think a thought, the functions of the current situations are usually altered by   
     the content of that thought because symbols are mutually related to other events. For   
     example, when one thinks of a lemon, some of the reactions produced by an actual  
     lemon occur, at least in weakened form. For example, one may “visualize” a lemon  
     and one’s mouth may water…Because many contexts are of this kind, people can  
     come to interact with the world as cognitively organized without noticing that they are  
     constantly organizing it. Verbal or cognitive constructions come to substitute for  
     direct contact with events (p. 73). 
Cognitive fusion becomes problematic when it causes individuals to become excessively 
attached to the content of their thoughts, making psychological flexibility difficult or 
impossible. The verbally-conceptualized and evaluated world cannot be distinguished 
from the world of direct experience, meaning that anything imported into human 
experience by language will have its effects as if it is the product of nature itself 
(Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson, & Gifford, 2004). 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy incorporates various cognitive defusion 
techniques to help individuals to “defuse” from them aning of their thoughts and instead 
become more aware of thinking as an ongoing relation l process. These techniques 
attempt to alter the ordinary meanings of language in various ways so that the literal 
meanings of words become disrupted, allowing individuals to experience thoughts as 
thoughts, feelings as feelings, memories as memories, and physical sensations as physical 
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sensations, none of which are inherently harmful (Hayes et al., 1999). These techniques 
are comparable to mindfulness meditation practices, which emphasize nonjudgmental 
attention to one’s present-moment experiencing. These t chniques seek to change the 
context of thinking, in order to promote a metacognitive shift to the acceptance of all 
thoughts as being appraised as just thoughts that do not need to be believed or considered 
personally relevant to the individual (e.g., Bach & Hayes, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; 
Teasdale et al., 2002).   
In the aforementioned example of the mother with OCD who experiences 
recurrent doubts that she may sexually abuse her infant son, an Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy treatment approach may focus on helping the mother become more 
willing to accept these negative thoughts, while continuing to act in valued ways (e.g., 
bathing her son in a loving manner). To increase the willingness to experience these 
obsessive thoughts, the mother may be instructed to verbally repeat the word “molest” 
over and over again until she experiences the word as just a meaningless sound, or 
verbalize the thoughts in the voice of a cartoon character. The goal of these exercises is 
for the anxiety-provoking thought to be experienced in a more detached context so that it 
need not be feared and actively resisted. 
Cognitive defusion techniques make up a core element of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy. They are frequently used through t therapy to help clients caught 
up in the content of their own cognitive activity limit their negative interpretations of 
their thoughts. A goal of this process is for clients to become accepting of their thoughts 
being just thoughts and feelings being just feelings, as opposed to being valid indicators 
of reality. These techniques emphasize the awareness of the process, rather than the 
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content, of thinking and feeling (Hayes et al., 1999). The Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy approach views an individual’s interactions with their thoughts (i.e., 
metacognition), rather than the occurrence or non-occurrence of negative thoughts, as 
being of primary importance in whether dysfunction will occur. Mindfulness meditation, 
paradox, and metaphor are some examples of cognitive defusion techniques, in that they 
all promote a shift in language towards noticing the ongoing process of thinking rather 
than focusing on thought content. There are more than wenty-five different cognitive 
defusion techniques used in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, with new techniques 
continuously being developed (Luoma & Hayes, 2003). However, to date there are few 
studies which have directly tested the theoretical assumptions of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy in regards to the effectiveness of cognitive defusion techniques in 
increasing the awareness of the process of thinking. 
There is recent preliminary evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy interventions may be mediated by changes in 
metacognitive processes, specifically, how individuals come to appraise their thoughts as 
being less believable. Bach and Hayes (2002) examined the impact of a brief version of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in preventing the re ospitalization of psychiatric 
inpatients experiencing auditory hallucinations or delusions. Patients were randomly 
assigned to either three hours of an Acceptance and Commitment Therapy intervention 
which included the implementation of cognitive defusion techniques, or treatment as 
usual. Results showed that patients receiving Acceptance and Commitment Therapy were 
half as likely as those receiving only treatment as usual to be rehospitalized during a four 
month follow-up period. Interestingly, those receiving Acceptance and Commitment 
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Therapy were more likely to report hallucinations and delusions at follow-up than 
patients receiving treatment as usual; however, following Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy, patients were l ss likely to believe the content of their hallucinations and 
delusions when they occurred, indicating a change i their metacognitive beliefs. Bach 
and Hayes suggest that an acceptance of unpleasant thoughts and a decrease in the belief 
in the content of thoughts may be more important than reductions in the frequency of 
negative thoughts. These results have since been replicat d (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006a, 
2006b), with the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy group again demonstrating 
significantly decreased belief in hallucinations compared to the control group at post-
intervention. 
Studies indicate that a decrease in the believability of negative thoughts has 
therapeutic benefit. In a comparison of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy versus 
cognitive therapy in the treatment of major depressiv  disorder, Zettle and Hayes (1986) 
assigned 18 depressed women to receive either 12 sessions of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy or 12 sessions of cognitive therapy. Both treatment groups were 
found to have significantly improved at 2-month follow-up. However, participants in the 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy treatment group were rated by an independent 
evaluator, blind to treatment condition, as significantly less depressed than those 
receiving cognitive therapy. Interestingly, whereas both groups reported similar 
reductions in the frequency of depressive automatic thoughts (with a reduction in 
depressive thinking being a goal of CBT but not Acceptance and Commitment Therapy), 
individuals receiving Acceptance and Commitment Therapy reported significantly greater 
reductions in the belief in depressive automatic thoughts than did individuals receiving 
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cognitive therapy. In a recent re-analysis of these data (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & 
Lillis, 2006), patients’ week 6 ratings of their belief in their depressive automatic 
thoughts differed significantly between treatment groups [F (1, 16) = 8.61, p = .01; 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy M = 49.00, SD = 10.95, Cognitive Therapy M = 
92.25, SD = 34.77, d = 1.68). These ratings were then assessed for their rol  as a mediator 
of outcomes on the post-treatment Beck Depression Inventory scores (Beck et al., 1961), 
which revealed a significant difference in treatment outcome [F (1, 16) = 4.61, p < .05; 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy M = 4.83, SD = 5.19 versus Cognitive Therapy M 
= 19.42, SD = 16.01, d = 1.23). 
In the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy treatment lit rature, empirical 
evidence suggests that reductions in the believability of negative thoughts and symptoms 
occur as a result of both brief and full interventio s (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & 
Herbert, 2006a, 2006b; Zettle & Hayes, 1986). However, until recently there has not been 
any examination of specific cognitive defusion techniques administered independently of 
the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy treatment package. One cognitive defusion 
technique that is commonly used in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy is the verbal 
repetition of a word or thought (Hayes et al., 1999). This technique has a long 
psychological history, beginning with Tichener (1916), who first described how the rapid 
repetition of a word or phrase can temporarily prevent access to its meaning. He 
suggested that with repetition, “the word soon becomes meaningless; the direction of 
attention has given a sort of hypnotic narrowness to consciousness, the associative 
context of the word is cut off, and the bare perception remains” (p. 425).   
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The loss of meaning following the rapid repetition of a word has been studied in 
cognitive psychology under the label of semantic satiation. The semantic satiation 
hypothesis refers to the proposition that prolonged repetition of a word will lead to the 
subjective experience of loss of meaning of that word. Numerous investigations have 
been conducted to test the validity of this hypothesis using different methodologies. 
Although a number of studies have supported the semantic satiation hypothesis (Balota & 
Black, 1997; Kanungo & Lambert, 1963; Lewis & Ellis, 2000; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-
Moreau, & Russell, 2006; Pilotti, Antrobus, & Duff, 1997; Pynte, 1991; Smith, 1984; 
Smith & Klein, 1990), other studies have failed to support it (Cohene, Smith, & Klein, 
1978; Esposito & Pelton, 1969, 1971; Frenck-Mestre, Besson, & Pynte, 1997; Neely, 
1977). However, it has been suggested that certain tasks used to detect semantic satiation 
may not be adequate to do so. For example, Balota and Chumbley (1984) argued that the 
lexical decision task used by Cohene et al. (1978) and Neely (1977) is inappropriate 
because the task can be completed without accessing the actual meaning of the word. 
On the other hand, studies using the category membership decision task (CMDT) 
have reliably detected semantic satiation effects (Lewis & Ellis, 2000; Lindquist et al., 
2006; Pilotti et al., 1997; Pynte, 1991; Smith, 1984; Smith & Klein, 1990; although see 
Frenck-Mestre et al., 1997). In this task, a category name (e.g., animal) is verbally 
repeated either a few or many times, after which the participant makes a rapid decision as 
to whether a target word (e.g., dog) is a member of the category. Semantic satiation is 
said to be evidenced by an increase in response time for member target words when 
preceded by verbal repetition of the category name many times, but no increase in 
response time for nonmember target words when preceded by verbal repetition of the 
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category. For example, in Smith’s (1984) study of semantic satiation, participants 
repeated the name of a category (e.g., fruit) either 3 or 30 times, after which they had to 
decide whether a target word (e.g., apple) was a member of the category. Smith found 
that decision time increased with repetitions when the target word was a member of the 
repeated category (e.g., fruit-apple), whereas no increase was found for nonmember 
target words (e.g., fruit-car). This suggests that rapid verbal repetition of a word 
decreases the availability of semantic information related to that word, causing a 
temporary weakening of the links to the word’s associative network of meaning.   
In a similar methodology, participants make a rapid decision as to the relatedness 
of a word pair following the verbal repetition of a word (Balota & Black, 1997; Black, 
2001). For example, verbal repetition of the word “dog” is followed by a decision as to 
whether “dog-cat” is a related or unrelated word pair. A reduction in the ability to make a 
rapid correct judgment on related word pair trials s considered evidence that semantic 
satiation has occurred.   
Balota and Black (1997; Experiment 1 and 2) had younger and older participants 
(mean age, approximately 20 and 70 years, respectively) repeat a target word (e.g., dog) 
either 2, 12, or 22 times, after which they made rapid decisions about whether two 
visually presented words were semantically related (e.g., dog-cat) or unrelated (e.g., dog-
chair). Semantic satiation was defined as a reduction of the difference in mean response 
latency and accuracy between responses to related and unrelated word pairs. Results 
found evidence of semantic satiation in younger, but not older, participants. The lack of 
satiation effects in the older adults is consistent with other work supporting age-related 
changes in satiation-type effects (e.g., McDowd & Filion, 1992; Warren & Warren, 
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1966). It is suggested that the age-difference results from a decreased activation of lexical 
and semantic representations from the orthographic pattern with age (Balota & Duchek, 
1988), which would produce a decrease in semantic satiation effects (Balota & Black, 
1997). Interestingly, Balota and Black also found that if a word is repeated that is 
unrelated to the word pair presented, no semantic satiation occurs, which suggests that a 
generalized fatigue or decreased attentional alertness is not responsible for the satiation 
effects found in younger adults (Experiment 4). Based on the results from the four 
experiments, Balota and Black concluded that semantic sa iation is a semantic 
phenomenon arising from the decreased access to themeaning of the repeated word. 
Other investigations using the relatedness decision task have supported the semantic 
satiation hypothesis, at least in young adults (Black, 2001). 
Recently, Lindquist et al. (2006) used a category membership decision paradigm 
to examine whether individuals would have more difficulty identifying emotion in others 
following the semantic satiation of relevant emotion words. Participants repeated an 
emotion category word (e.g., “fear”) out loud either 3 or 30 times, following which they 
were presented with a picture of a facial behaviour (e.g., a face depicting fear) and asked 
to judge whether or not the facial behaviour matched t  word they had previously 
repeated. Lindquist et al. found that participants were slower to categorize faces depicting 
various emotions after the same emotion word was repeat d 30 times. The authors 
interpreted these results as evidence that interfering with the accessibility of emotion 
category words results in slowed emotional perception, and provided initial support for 
their hypothesis that the perception of emotion is i  part driven by language. 
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Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, and Twohig (2004) examined th  impact of the rapid 
verbal repetition of a self-relevant negative thought in reducing the believability and 
discomfort associated with that thought. Using an alternating treatments design (Barlow 
& Hayes, 1979), 8 female undergraduate students generated two self-relevant negative 
thoughts (e.g., “I am too fat”), each of which they r stated as one word (e.g., “fat”). 
Participants then rated the degree of discomfort as well as the believability of each 
thought, after which they received a rationale and instructions for the use of various 
interventions (verbal repetition, distraction, and thought control) and then completed 30 
seconds of each intervention. Following each intervention, participants re-rated the 
degree of discomfort and belief in the thought. Masuda et al. found that the verbal 
repetition plus cognitive defusion rationale condition resulted in significantly greater 
reductions in both discomfort and believability than either of the comparison approaches.   
Masuda et al. (unpublished manuscript) followed up their preliminary 
investigation of verbal repetition with two experiments designed to measure the amount 
of change in the believability and discomfort associated with self-relevant negative 
thoughts following various durations of the verbal repetition technique. In Experiment 1, 
75 undergraduate students rated the degree of discomfort and belief in a self-relevant 
negative thought, after which they were randomly assigned to receive a cognitive 
defusion rationale only, a rationale plus 3 seconds of verbal repetition of their thought, or 
a rationale plus 20 seconds of verbal repetition. Results indicated that the rationale-only 
condition reduced distress significantly less than both the 3 second and the 20 second 
verbal repetition conditions, with no differences between the latter two conditions. For 
believability ratings, the rationale-only condition reduced believability significantly less 
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than both the 3 second and the 20 second verbal repetition conditions, and the 20 second 
condition reduced believability by a significantly greater amount than the 3 second 
condition. Experiment 2 repeated the design from Experiment 1, but included verbal 
repetition conditions of 1, 10, and 30 seconds. Experiment 2 results were such that the 10 
second and 30 second conditions were associated with greater reductions in distress and 
believability than were the 1 second and rationale-only conditions, with no significant 
differences between the 10 and 30 second conditions.   
Overall, the work of Masuda, Hayes, and colleagues s ggests that the cognitive 
defusion technique of rapid verbal repetition of sel -r levant negative thoughts, along 
with a cognitive defusion rationale, is an effective technique for reducing the 
believability and discomfort associated with these thoughts, at least in the immediate 
short-term. A question left unanswered, however, is what mechanism(s) is/are actually 
responsible for the observed reductions in discomfort and believability following verbal 
repetition. Hayes et al. (1999) suggest that the verbal repetition of thoughts cause these 
thoughts to temporarily lose their meaning and be viewed differently; in particular, the 
thoughts become seen as ju t thoughts or noise, and are experienced apart from their 
normal literal functions and meaning. However, Masuda et al. (2004; unpublished 
manuscript) did not explicitly test for a reduction in meaning in either of their studies, 
and it is not known whether changes in meaningfulness actually occurred or whether a 
loss of meaning mediated the decrease in believability and/or discomfort for the verbal 
repetition condition.   
It is also not known whether the results obtained by Masuda et al. (2004; 
unpublished manuscript) following verbal repetition are different from what might occur 
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following imaginal exposure of the thought for an equivalent duration of time. Repeated 
exposure to any stimulus produces habituation, which is generally conceptualized as a 
reduction in the responsiveness of the neural structu es involved in processing incoming 
information (e.g., Sokolov, 1991). Habituation allows for repetitive extraneous 
information to be filtered out in order to decrease th  allocation of resources to redundant 
information (Cowan, 1988). Although there is some controversy over the mechanism(s) 
underlying why exposure is an effective treatment for anxiety-related problems, one view 
is that a requirement for successful exposure is that habituation to the anxious thoughts 
occurs during each exposure session. This is thought to promote an overall reduction in 
the exaggerated responses and disconfirmation of the expectancy of an aversive outcome, 
leading to the extinction of anxious responding (for a recent review of the processes that 
may be involved in exposure therapy, see Craske & Mystkowski, 2006). As such, it is 
possible that the results obtained by Masuda, Hayes, and colleagues are attributable to a 
habituation to the negative thoughts, rather than a reduction in the meaningfulness of the 
thoughts (i.e., semantic satiation). There is some res arch to suggest that, at least in 
individuals with OCD, habituation through exposure and response prevention can change 
unrealistic beliefs without any direct cognitive or metacognitive intervention (Ito, De 
Araujo, Hemsley, & Marks, 1995; Whittal, Thordarson, & McLean, 2005). However, in 
general, the impact of exposure therapy on changing beliefs is not well known.   
Overview 
The present study was a preliminary investigation of the effects of verbal 
repetition in reducing the believability, distress, and meaningfulness of contamination-
related thoughts in an analogue sample of individuals reporting high levels of OCD 
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symptoms. This is an exploratory study that tested whether the verbal repetition 
technique that has been recently found to reduce the believability and discomfort 
associated with self-relevant negative thoughts is more effective than brief imaginal 
exposure in the reappraisal of contamination-related thoughts. Participants identified 
three contamination-related thoughts, after which they completed the CMDT as a test of 
whether semantic satiation occurs following verbal epetition and/or imaginal exposure. 
They then completed ratings of the believability, distress, and meaningfulness associated 
with each identified contamination-related thought. For each of the three identified 
thoughts, participants then completed a 30-second period of either verbal repetition, 
imaginal exposure, or no intervention, and re-rated th  thought on the above dimensions. 
Finally, all participants returned to the laboratory ne week later to assess for the 
temporal stability of any changes in the appraisals of their contamination-related 
thoughts. 
Research Questions   
The purpose of the present study is fourfold: (1) to investigate whether verbal 
repetition immediately reduces the believability, distress, and meaningfulness associated 
with contamination-related thoughts to a greater extent than does imaginal exposure or no 
intervention; (2) to determine if verbal repetition a d/or imaginal exposure is associated 
with stable reductions in the believability, distres, and meaningfulness associated with 
the identified thoughts, as seen in the one-week follow-up; (3) to determine if verbal 
repetition and/or imaginal exposure produces semantic sa iation effects, as assessed by 
the CMDT; and (4) to examine if any observed semantic satiation effects are associated 
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with the reduction of belief, distress, and meaningfulness appraisals of the contamination-
related thoughts. 
Changes in the believability, distress, and meaningful ess of contamination-
related thoughts were assessed via 100-mm visual analogue scale ratings at four points: i) 
at baseline, prior to completing the CMDT (pre-CMDT); ii) immediately following the 
CMDT and prior to randomly receiving either verbal repetition, imaginal exposure, or no 
intervention (pre-intervention); iii) immediately following the intervention (post-
intervention); and iv) at one-week follow-up (follow-up). Semantic satiation was assessed 
through a comparison of mean median response times (RTs) in the CMDT. Correlations 
between semantic satiation effects and visual analogue scale appraisal ratings of belief, 
distress, and meaningfulness at post-intervention and follow-up following verbal 
repetition and imaginal exposure were also assessed.  
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that verbal repetition would produce significantly greater 
reductions in the believability, distress, and meaningfulness associated with the identified 
contamination-related thoughts than would imaginal exposure and no intervention, and 
that this would be observed both at post-intervention and at one week follow-up. It was 
also hypothesized that semantic satiation effects would be found in the CMDT following 
verbal repetition, as has been found in previous semantic satiation experiments (e.g., 
Smith, 1984), but not following imaginal exposure. The magnitude of the semantic 
satiation effect was expected to correlate negatively with the appraisal ratings at both 
post-intervention and follow-up (i.e., higher semantic satiation scores would be 




The sample consisted of 93 undergraduate students (82 women, 11 men) with a 
mean age of 19.39 years (SD = 1.76). Participants were a subset of individuals from a 
large pool of individuals enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University 
of Waterloo. All individuals had completed a large number of psychological measures as 
part of the course, including the Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision 
(PI-WSUR; Burns, Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996) and the Interpretations of 
Intrusions Inventory [Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG), 
2001. For details of all measures, see below]. Participants received course credit in 
exchange for participation in this study.   
Inclusion criteria for the present study was a PI-WSUR contamination obsessions 
and washing compulsions (PI-WSUR COWC) subscale score that was no less than the 
mean subscale score of a clinical sample of individuals diagnosed with OCD [M = 13.9, 
SD = 8.0 (possible range is 0-40); as reported in Burns et al., 1996]. This was to ensure 
that participants were individuals who report being disturbed by contamination-related 
thoughts at a clinically significant level.   
Measures 
 PI-WSUR. The PI-WSUR is a 39-item self-report measure of obsessions and 
compulsions. It is a revised version of the Padua Inventory (PI; Sanavio, 1988); this 
revision was undertaken in order to reduce the original PI’s overlap with worry. Each 
item is rated on a 5-point (0-4) scale, according to the degree of disturbance caused by 
the thought or the behaviour. The PI-WSUR consists of five subscales: (1) contamination 
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obsessions and washing compulsions (10 items, e.g., “I find it difficult to touch garbage 
or dirty things”); (2) dressing/grooming compulsions (3 items, e.g., “I feel obliged to 
follow a particular order in dressing, undressing, and washing myself”); (3) checking 
compulsions (10 items, e.g., “I tend to keep on checking things more often than 
necessary”); (4) obsessional thoughts of harm to self/others (7 items, e.g., “When I hear 
about a disaster, I think it is somehow my fault”); and (5) obsessional impulses to harm 
self/others (9 items, e.g., “I sometimes have an impulse to hurt defenseless children or 
animals”). The factor structure of the PI-WSUR has been supported, and the alpha 
coefficients of the different subscales have been fou d to be quite high (Burns et al., 
1996). 
 Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory (See Footnote). The Interpretations of 
Intrusions Inventory is a 31-item self-report measure which assesses three categories of 
interpretations of intrusive thoughts (i.e., metacognitive beliefs), including the 
importance of thoughts (10 items, e.g., “The more I think about these things, the greater 
the risk they will come true”), the perceived responsibility for having these thoughts (10 
items, e.g., “If I ignore this thought, I could be responsible for serious harm”), and 
control of the thoughts (11 items, e.g., “I should be able to rid my mind of this thought“). 
Respondents are first asked to identify two examples of intrusive thoughts that they have 
experienced, and interpretations of these intrusive thoughts are made by rating each of the 
31 items on a scale of beliefs ranging from 0 (I did not believe this idea at all) to 100 (I 
was completely convinced this idea was true). The Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory 
has been shown to have good reliability and convergent validity and is able to distinguish 
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individuals with OCD from individuals with other anxiety disorders and controls 
(OCCWG, 2001). 
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS is a 20-item self-report measure of tw  broad mood states, termed 
positive affect (10 items) and negative affect (10 items). Positive affect reflects positive 
feelings and emotions such as interest, excitement, and determination. Negative affect 
reflects negative feelings and emotions such as fear, irritability, and shame. Items are 
rated on a 5-point scale, 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). By changing the 
time frame of the questioning, the PANAS can be used as either a trait (i.e., how you feel 
generally) or state (i.e., how you feel at a particular moment) measure. Positive affect and 
negative affect have been shown to be distinctive dmensions which are not generally 
correlated (Watson et al., 1988). Good internal and test-retest reliability have been shown 
in nonclinical samples, and adequate construct validity has also been demonstrated 
(Watson et al., 1988). 
Procedure  
Upon arrival to the laboratory and after giving informed consent to participate in 
the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups: i) 
verbal repetition, ii) imaginal exposure, or iii) no intervention. Each participant began the 
study by completing the PANAS, with instructions to rate each item using the prompt “to
the extent you feel this way right now”, in order to assess their present mood state. 
Participants were then given a list of nine contamination-related words (e.g., disease, 
germs, urine, see Appendix A) and asked to rank, in order, the thr e words that are most 
distressing to them. They also were instructed to write down, in one brief sentence, a 
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distressing thought they experience involving the identified word, for each of their three 
identified words. Participants were then given a list of nine “automobile-related” words 
(e.g., mazda, ford, dodge, see Appendix B) and asked to rank, in order, the thr e words 
that are most familiar to them. All participants then completed three visual analogue scale 
appraisal ratings (pre-CMDT ratings) for each of their identified contamination-related 
thoughts: (1) Belief: “How believable is the thought?” (0 = not at all believable; 100 = 
very believable), (2) Distress: “How distressed are you by the thought?” (0 = not at all 
distressed; 100 = very distressed), and (3) Meaningfulness: “How meaningful is the 
thought?” (0 = not at all meaningful; 100 = very meaningful). They were also asked to 
complete appraisal ratings for a general thought they experience related to the word 
“contamination” (Appendix C). All visual analogue scale ratings were made via paper 
and pencil measures and they were hand-scored by the experimenter by measuring the 
exact point on the 100-mm scale where the line was dr wn by the participant to indicate 
their rating. 
At this time, participants were seated at the computer and given instructions for 
the CMDT. The CMDT used in the present study is similar to the procedures laid out by 
Smith (1984, Experiment 1). In Smith’s study, participants were shown 40 different 
category names, with each name followed by a target word that was either a member or 
nonmember of that category. Participants were requid to make rapid member/non-
member decisions for each target word. The present task used 44 items, which included 
38 items developed by Smith and 6 items we developed (Appendix D). Two category-
target pairs from Smith’s study were excluded because they contained words which could 
be considered aversive by participants (DISEASE and CANCER). In addition, the 
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present task included 36 trials of the same aversiv category word 
(“CONTAMINATION”) with different member targets (the three contamination-related 
words previously identified by the participant; e.g., excrement) and nonmember target 
words (the three automobile-related words previously identified by the participant; e.g., 
toyota). The task also included 36 trials of the same neutral category word 
(“AUTOMOBILE”) with different member target words (the three automobile-related 
words previously identified by the participant; e.g., toyota) and nonmember target words 
(the three contamination-related words previously identified by the participant; e.g., 
excrement).       
CMDT Design 
For the present CMDT, category names were presented i  uppercase letters, and 
target words were presented in lowercase letters at the center of a 17-inch VGA color 
monitor. Participants completed 116 experimental tri s, including trials of each of six 
types of category-target word pairs, or trial types: (1) neutral category – member target 
(e.g., TOOL – hammer; n = 22), (2) neutral category – nonmember target (e.g., BIRD – 
doll; n = 22), (3) “contamination” category – member target (e.g., CONTAMINATION – 
virus; n = 18), (4) “contamination” category – nonmember target (e.g., 
CONTAMINATION – toyota; n = 18), (5) “automobile”  category – member target (e.g., 
AUTOMOBILE – toyota; n = 18), and (6) “automobile” category – nonmember target 
(e.g., AUTOMOBILE – virus; n = 18). Trials were presented in two separate blocks. 
Participants completed a block of the 44 neutral category – member/nonmember targets, 
followed by a second block of 72 trials of “contamination” category – 
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member/nonmember targets and “automobile” category – member/nonmember targets, 
with the order of blocks of trials counterbalanced. 
For the present task, participants assigned previously to the verbal repetition 
intervention engaged in verbal repetition of each category word, whereas participants 
assigned to the imaginal exposure intervention were ask d to imagine a picture of each 
category word during each trial presentation. Participants in the no intervention condition 
were randomly assigned to complete the CMDT according to either verbal repetition 
instructions (n = 15) or imaginal exposure instructions ( = 15). 
On half of the trials all participants completed a “long” trial (30 repetitions of the 
category word or an equivalent duration of imaginal exposure of the category word); on 
the other half of the trials, participants engaged in a “short” trial (3 repetitions of the 
category word or an equivalent duration of imaginal exposure). Prior to the 
administration of the experimental trials, 10 practice rials of similar neutral category – 
member/nonmember targets were provided to illustrate the task requirements and to 
familiarize the participant with the displays.   
CMDT Procedure 
  The following sequence of events occurred for each trial: (1) a fixation point 
appeared in the center of the screen, signaling the participant to press the space bar to 
start the trial; (2) the category name first appeared in two locations at the centre of the 
screen for 1000 msec. After this time, the verbal repetition participants saw the word 
displayed either 3 or 30 times for 500 msec, with a 200-msec interval between exposures. 
Verbal repetition participants were instructed to say the word out loud each presentation. 
Imaginal exposure participants saw the word presentd first for 1000 msec, after which 
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the word turned into a symbol of equivalent length (e.g., from “TOOL” to “%%%%”)1, 
which was displayed either 3 or 30 times for 500 msec, with a 200-msec interval between 
exposures, and served as a prompt to continue imagining the word; (3) an auditory signal 
alerted participants to the end of the interval; (4) a fixation point appeared for 1000 msec 
to serve as a warning signal for the target word; (5) a target word appeared in the middle 
of the screen; (6) participants signaled, as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether 
the target word was a member or nonmember of the category name. Half of the 
participants signaled “member” with their left index finger (“a” key) and “nonmember” 
with the right index finger (“l” key), whereas the other half used the reverse mapping. If 
no response was made within 3000 msec, the trial automatically ended; and (7) the 
fixation point returned, prompting participants to press the space bar in order to start the 
next trial.   
During the CMDT, no feedback was given as to whether participants correctly 
responded on each trial. Participants were instructed to make each decision as quickly 
and as accurately as possible, and were told that the experimenter would be monitoring 
them behind the one-way mirror, in order to ensure compliance with the task.   
Upon completion of the CMDT, each participant rated their perceived ability to 
carry out the intervention (verbal repetition or imaginal exposure) during the task, from 0 
= not at all able, to 100 = very able (Appendix E), to check for any potential differences 
between the two CMDT groups in terms of their ability to use their intervention during 
the task. All participants again completed visual analogue scale Belief, Distress, and 
Meaningfulness appraisal ratings (pre-intervention ratings) for each of their three 
                                                
1 This change from the category word to the symbol was intended to prevent imaginal exposure participants 
from merely repeating the category word silently during the time period, and to prompt them to continue 
imagining a scene involving the word. 
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identified contamination-related thoughts and their g neral “contamination” thought. 
Participants then received their randomly assigned i tervention of verbal repetition (n = 
33), imaginal exposure (n = 30), or no intervention (n = 30), each of which are described 
below. 
Verbal repetition. Participants viewed a 5-minute, 30 second videotaped cognitive 
defusion rationale, adapted from Masuda et al. (2004), prior to engaging in the verbal 
repetition technique. This rationale highlights theadvantages of literal language and 
thought, as well as the problem of language and thoug t in creating anxious thinking. It 
also includes a demonstration of verbal repetition, whereby the actor is asked to repeat 
the word “milk” out loud as fast as possible for 30 seconds to demonstrate how its 
context changes and its meaning disappears with the repetition of the word (Appendix F).  
Imaginal exposure. Participants viewed a 4-minute, 15 second videotaped 
habituation rationale, adapted from Baer (2000) and similar in format to the verbal 
repetition rationale, prior to engaging in the imagin l exposure technique. This rationale 
explains how imaginal exposure to anxious thoughts can help with the process of 
habituation, or getting used to anxious thoughts, so they do not seem so distressing. It 
includes a demonstration of imaginal exposure, whereby the actor is asked to imagine in 
detail an anxious event (a scary-looking dog barking at her) for 30 seconds, to 
demonstrate how the scene becomes less distressing as she continues to concentrate on it 
(Appendix G).  
No intervention. The no intervention control group sat quietly for a period of three 
minutes, receiving no instructions. 
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Following the videotaped rationale, and immediately prior to the actual 
completion of the 30-second intervention, verbal repetition and imaginal exposure 
participants rated how credible they perceived their intervention rationale (0 = not at all 
credible; 100 = very credible, see Appendix H). Verbal repetition participants were then 
given instructions to repeat the first of their three identified words out loud, as fast as 
possible, for 30 seconds, following which they completed visual analogue scale Belief, 
Distress, and Meaningfulness ratings for the associated contamination-related thought 
(post-intervention ratings). They then completed verbal repetition for their remaining two 
words, completing visual analogue scale ratings after each use of the technique. Imaginal 
exposure participants were asked to imagine a scene involving the first of their three 
identified contamination-related thoughts and to concentrate on it in detail for a period of 
30 seconds, following which they completed visual analogue scale Belief, Distress, and 
Meaningfulness ratings for that thought. They then completed 30 seconds of imaginal 
exposure for their remaining two thoughts, completing ratings after each period of 
imaginal exposure. The no intervention group completed visual analogue scale ratings for 
each of their three identified thoughts immediately fo lowing the three-minute relaxation 
period. 
Finally, all participants completed the Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory, 
after which they were notified that the experiment was over for the day. Participants were 
asked to return to the laboratory one week later for a brief follow-up involving the 
completion of some questionnaires.   
One-Week Follow-Up Procedure 
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Upon their return to the laboratory one week later, all participants completed the 
PANAS, with instructions to rate each item using the prompt “to the extent you feel this 
way right now”, in order to assess their present mood state. Participants then completed 
visual analogue scale Belief, Distress, and Meaningful ess ratings for each of their three 
contamination-related thoughts and the general “contamination” thought (follow-up 
ratings), followed by completion of the Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory and PI-
WSUR.  Participants in the verbal repetition and imaginal exposure conditions were also 
asked to indicate whether or not they used their intervention at all during the week, and if 
so, they rated the extent to which they used it during the week, from 0 = not at all, to 100 
= all the time (Appendix I). Participants were then instructed that the experiment was 
over and were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results 
Participant Characteristics 
Table 1 displays the gender distribution and the group means and standard 
deviations for age, PANAS scores, visual analogue scale ratings of the credibility of the 
assigned intervention, and amount of intervention practice. Ninety-three participants 
(verbal repetition n = 33; imaginal exposure n = 30; no intervention = 30) attended the 
first session and 88 participants (verbal repetition n = 30; imaginal exposure n = 30; no 
intervention n = 28) returned to complete the questionnaire package at one-week follow-
up.  
There was an equal distribution of men and women in each experimental group, χ2 
(2) = 1.79, p = .41. There was a trend towards a significant age diff rence between 
groups, F (2, 90) = 2.78, p = .068, MSE = 2.97, with verbal repetition participants being, 
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on average, one year younger than no intervention participants. There were no significant 
differences in positive or negative affect between groups at either the first session or the 
follow-up session (all Fs < 1.19, ps > .31). 
Preliminary Analyses 
The belief, distress, and meaningfulness appraisal ratings for each group at each 
time point were examined for outliers. An appraisal rating was labeled an outlier if it had 
a z score that was less than -3 or greater than 3, and w s discontinuous from the rest of 
the distribution. No outliers were detected for the following analyses, unless specified. 
The no intervention participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two 
sets of CMDT instructions: verbal repetition (n = 15) or imaginal exposure (n = 15) 
instructions. A 4 (time; Pre-CMDT, Pre-intervention, Post-intervention, Follow-up) x 2 
(group; No Intervention – Verbal Repetition, No Intervention – Imaginal Exposure) 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if the 
differing CMDT requirements had a significant impact on the subsequent visual analogue 
scale ratings. Two participants from the no intervention – imaginal exposure group did 
not attend the follow-up session, and their data were excluded from the analyses. There 
was a significant main effect of time for the meaningfulness ratings for identified 
contamination-related thought #1, F (3, 23) = 4.39, p < .05, MSE = 133.72, such that 
there was a significant increase in ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention. There 
was, however, no significant group by time interaction, F (3, 23) = .37, p = .78, MSE = 
133.72. There was also a trend towards a main effect o  time for the distress ratings for 
contamination-related thought #1, F (3, 23) = 2.45, p = .09, MSE = 101.52, such that 
there was a slight decrease in ratings from pre-intrvention to follow-up. There was, 
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however, no significant group by time interaction, F (3, 23) = 1.11, p = .36, MSE = 
101.52. There were no other significant differences in ratings between no intervention – 
verbal repetition and no intervention – imaginal exposure groups, and no differences in 
change across time for either group (examination of all other main effects: Fs < 1.60, ps 
> .21; examination of interactions: all Fs < 1.55, ps > .22). As no significant differences 
were observed between the two groups, it suggests tha  the differing CMDT requirements 
did not differentially affect the participants, and they were collapsed into one group (no 
intervention n = 28) for the present analyses.   
Tests of the Main Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that significantly greater reductions in the belief, distress, and 
meaningfulness associated with contamination-related thoughts would occur immediately 
following verbal repetition than immediately following imaginal exposure and no 
intervention. In addition, it was hypothesized that the significant differences in appraisal 
ratings between verbal repetition and both imaginal exposure and no intervention would 
also be observed at one-week follow-up. 
Follow-up appraisal ratings were unavailable for the five participants who did not 
attend the follow-up session. As such, their data could not be entered into the repeated 
measures analyses and these participants were exclud d from all subsequent analyses, 
unless otherwise specified. 
The verbal repetition rationale was rated as significantly more credible (M = 
72.43, SD = 15.43) than the imaginal exposure rationale [M = 56.97, SD = 25.05; t (58) = 
2.88, p < .01]. Seven verbal repetition participants (23.3%) and 8 imaginal exposure 
participants (26.7%) reported using their intervention during the week. There were no 
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significant differences in the amount each intervention was used during the week by these 
participants [verbal repetition, M = 40.43, SD = 32.35 versus imaginal exposure, M = 
30.63, SD = 20.96; t (13) = .71, p = .49]. 
Correlations between pre-CMDT (baseline) appraisal ratings of belief, distress, 
and meaningfulness for each of the three identified contamination-related thoughts were 
attained, to ensure that the three variables were sufficiently independent constructs to 
warrant separate analyses for each type of appraisal. The correlation matrices for each of 
the three identified contamination-related thoughts are displayed in Table 2. Overall, 
there were only low to moderate correlations between th  three types of appraisals (range 
of rs: .23 to .57). 
For each participant, the mean rating of belief, distress, and meaningfulness was 
created by averaging their appraisal ratings for their t ree contamination-related thoughts 
at each time point. A series of 4 (time; Pre-CMDT, Pre-intervention, Post-intervention, 
Follow-up) x 3 (group; Verbal Repetition, Imaginal Exposure, No Intervention) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were then conducted to examine the change in the appraisals of 
belief, distress, and meaningfulness associated with the mean ratings of belief, distress, 
and meaningfulness following verbal repetition, imagin l exposure, and no intervention. 
For the belief ratings, there was a main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 11.27, p < .001, MSE = 
103.74, which was qualified by a significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 3.01, p 
< .01, MSE = 103.74. For the distress ratings, there was a there was a main effect of time, 
F (3, 83) = 7.73, p < .001, MSE = 147.90, and a significant time by group interaction, F 
(3, 83) = 3.58, p < .01, MSE = 147.90. For the meaningfulness ratings, there was a there 
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was a main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 13.79, p < .001, MSE = 125.30, and a significant 
time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 3.33, p < .01, MSE = 125.30. 
As each of the above time by group interactions were statistically significant, a 
series of 4 (time; Pre-CMDT, Pre-intervention, Post-intervention, Follow-up) x 3 (group; 
Verbal Repetition, Imaginal Exposure, No Interventio ) repeated measures ANOVAs 
were conducted to examine the change in the appraisals of belief, distress, and 
meaningfulness associated with each of the three identified contamination-related 
thoughts. Tables 3-5 display the visual analogue scale appraisal ratings of belief, distress, 
and meaningfulness for the three identified contamin tion-related thoughts. The results 
for contamination-related thought #1 are detailed blow; as the pattern of results for 
contamination-related thoughts #2 and #3 were similar to those found for thought #1, 
they are detailed in Appendices J and K, respectively. 
Appraisals of Identified Contamination-Related Thought #1 (Table 3) 
Belief Ratings (Figure A): There were no differences between groups in their 
belief ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-interventio  (all Fs < .12, ps > .73). There was 
an overall main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 8.45, p < .001, MSE = 200.62, but no 
significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 1.09, p = .37, MSE = 200.62. Despite no 
significant interaction present, planned comparisons were conducted to examine the 
change in ratings following verbal repetition and imaginal exposure, in order to 
determine if either intervention resulted in significant reductions in belief appraisals, at 
either post-intervention or follow-up (Keppel, 1991). For verbal repetition, planned 
comparisons revealed a trend towards a significant increase in belief ratings from pre-
CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 3.32, p = .07, MSE = 102.69. There was also a 
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significant decrease in belief ratings from pre-intervention to post-intervention, F (1, 85) 
= 8.37, p < .01, MSE = 209.13; from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 5.51, p < .05, 
MSE = 171.35; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 16.71, p < .001, MSE 
= 144.82. For imaginal exposure, there was a significant increase in belief ratings from 
pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 5.03, p < .05, MSE = 102.69. There was also a 
significant decrease in belief ratings from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 5.57, 
p < .05, MSE = 144.82, and a trend towards a decrease in belief ratings from post-
intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 3.67, p = .06, MSE = 248.54.   
Distress Ratings (Figure B): There was a significant difference between groups in 
their distress ratings at pre-CMDT, such that baseline verbal repetition ratings were lower 
than both imaginal exposure, F (1, 85) = 4.27, p < .05, MSE = 554.52, and no 
intervention, F (1, 85) = 7.62, p < .01, MSE = 554.52. There was also a trend for a 
difference between groups at pre-intervention, such that verbal repetition ratings were 
somewhat lower than no intervention, F (1, 85) = 3.57, p = .06, MSE = 651.85. There was 
an overall main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 7.71, p < .001, MSE = 220.77, in the reduction 
of distress, which was qualified by a significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 
3.48, p < .01, MSE = 220.77. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a trend 
for an increase in distress ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 3.59, p 
= .06, MSE = 164.30. There was a significant decrease in distres  ratings from pre-
CMDT to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 5.63, p < .05, MSE = 233.62; from pre-
intervention to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 20.11, p < .001, MSE = 182.25; and from 
pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 8.77, p < .01, MSE = 231.60. For imaginal 
exposure, there was a significant decrease in ratings from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 
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85) = 12.90, p = .001, MSE = 276.90; from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 
12.10, p = .001, MSE = 231.60; and from post-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 
19.17, p < .001, MSE = 235.98. For no intervention, there was a trend towards a decrease 
in ratings from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 3.66, p = .06, MSE = 231.60. 
Meaningfulness Ratings (Figure C): There were no differences between groups in 
their meaningfulness ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-intervention (all Fs < 1.57, ps > 
.20). There was an overall main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 8.57, p < .001, MSE = 231.74, 
which was qualified by a significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 2.27, p < .05, 
MSE = 231.74. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed an increase in 
meaningfulness ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 7.70, p < .01, 
MSE = 166.13. There was a significant decrease in meaningfulness ratings from pre-
intervention to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 16.75, p < .001, MSE = 215.14; and from 
pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 8.62, p < .01, MSE = 160.40. For imaginal 
exposure, there was a significant decrease from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 
4.20, p < .05, MSE = 160.40; and from post-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 4.20, p 
< .05, MSE = 226.57. For no intervention, there was a significant increase in 
meaningfulness ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 8.13, p < .01, 
MSE = 166.13. 
Overall, the above results (and the results detailed in Appendices J and K) 
revealed that significant reductions in belief, distre s, and meaningfulness appraisals were 
observed at post-intervention for only the verbal repetition group. At one-week follow-
up, the significant reductions following verbal repetition were, for the most part, 
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maintained. In addition, there were significant reductions in belief and distress ratings, 
from pre-CMDT to follow-up, for the imaginal exposure group.  
Between-Group Comparisons 
To determine if there were significant differences b tween intervention groups in 
their respective abilities to promote immediate change in appraisal ratings following the 
intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the 
belief, distress, and meaningfulness appraisal ratings for contamination-related thought 
#1. For the belief ratings, there was no main effect of time, F (1, 58) = 2.80, p = .10, MSE 
= 286.23. There was, however, a trend towards a significant time by group interaction, F 
(1, 58) = 3.33, p = .07, MSE = 286.23, suggesting that verbal repetition was more 
effective than imaginal exposure in immediately reducing the belief in the contamination-
related thought. For the distress and meaningfulness ratings, the main effects of time (Fs 
> 4.62, ps < .05), as well as the time by group interactions (Fs > 8.00, ps < .01), were 
significant, indicating that verbal repetition was significantly more effective than 
imaginal exposure in reducing the distress and meaningfulness associated with the 
thought. 
In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-up) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the 
appraisal ratings, to determine if there were significant differences in the change in 
ratings from baseline to one-week follow-up following verbal repetition and imaginal 
exposure. For the belief ratings, there was a trend towards a main effect of time, F (1, 58) 
= 3.50, p = .07, MSE = 190.20, but no time by group interaction, F (1, 58) = 1.65, p = .20, 
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MSE = 190.20, suggesting no differences between groups in their respective abilities to 
reduce the belief in the contamination-related thought. For the distress ratings, there was 
a main effect of time, F (1, 58) = 9.51, p < .01, MSE = 341.31, but no time by group 
interaction, F (1, 58) = 2.23, p = .14, MSE = 341.31, and for the meaningfulness ratings, 
neither the main effect of time nor the time by group interaction were significant (Fs < 
.42, ps > .51). Thus, the two intervention groups did not differ significantly in the 
reappraisal of contamination-related thoughts at follow-up.  
To compare verbal repetition and no intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-
intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Verbal Repetition, No Intervention) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted for the belief, distres  and meaningfulness ratings. 
Each of the main effects of time (Fs > 10.21, ps < .01), as well as each of the time by 
group interactions (Fs > 4.64, ps < .05) was significant. In addition, a series of 2 (time; 
Pre-CMDT, Follow-up) x 2 (group; Verbal Repetition, No Intervention) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted for the appraisal ratings, to determine if there were 
significant differences in the change in ratings from baseline to one-week follow-up 
following verbal repetition and no intervention. For the belief ratings, there was a trend 
towards a main effect of time, F (1, 56) = 3.11, p = .08, MSE = 186.04, but no time by 
group interaction, F (1, 56) = 1.87, p = .18, MSE = 186.04, suggesting no differences 
between groups in their respective abilities to reduc  the belief in the contamination-
related thought. For the distress ratings, there was a main effect of time, F (1, 56) = 5.48, 
p < .05, MSE = 168.89, but no time by group interaction, F (1, 56) = 0.01, p = .91, MSE = 
168.89. For the meaningfulness ratings, there was no main effect of time, F (1, 56) = .59, 
p = .45, MSE = 207.75, or time by group interaction, F (1, 56) = .81, p = .37, MSE = 
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207.75. Thus, verbal repetition was not significantly more effective than no intervention 
in the reduction of appraisal ratings at follow-up. 
To compare imaginal exposure and no intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-
intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Imaginal Exposure, No Intervention) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted for the belief, distres , and meaningfulness ratings. 
None of the main effects of time (Fs < .49, ps > .48), or the time by group interactions 
(Fs < 2.33, ps > .12) were significant. In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, 
Follow-up) x 2 (group; Imaginal Exposure, No Intervntion) repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted for the appraisal ratings, to determine if there were significant 
differences in the change in ratings from baseline to one-week follow-up following 
imaginal exposure and no intervention. For the belief and meaningfulness ratings, none of 
the main effects of time (Fs < .33, ps > .56), or the time by group interactions (F  < 1.94, 
ps > .16) were significant. For the distress ratings, there was a significant main effect of 
time, F (1, 56) = 10.38, p < .01, MSE = 318.39, but no time by group interaction, F (1, 
56) = 2.06, p = .16, MSE = 318.39. Thus, imaginal exposure was not significantly more 
effective than no intervention in the reduction of appraisal ratings at follow-up. 
Overall, these results indicate that verbal repetition was significantly more 
effective than both imaginal exposure and no intervention in the immediate reduction of 
appraisals of contamination-related thoughts. In cotrast, imaginal exposure and no 
intervention were equally ineffective in the immediate reappraisal of the thought. A 
comparison of the change in appraisal ratings from baseline to follow-up after verbal 
repetition and imaginal exposure revealed no change between intervention groups in the 
reduction of belief, distress, and meaningfulness ratings. There were significant 
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differences found between verbal repetition and no intervention at follow-up only in the 
reduction of distress and meaningfulness in thought #2, and there was a trend towards a 
significant difference in the reduction of meaningfulness in thought #3 (see Appendices J 
and K). Examination of the change in appraisal ratings from baseline and follow-up 
revealed significant differences between imaginal exposure and no intervention in the 
reduction of belief in thought #3, and a trend towards a significant difference in the 
reduction of distress in thought #3 (see Appendix K).      
Appraisals of “Contamination” Thought (Table 6) 
In addition to completing visual analogue scale ratings of the belief, distress, and 
meaningfulness associated with the three identified contamination-related thoughts, all 
participants completed appraisal ratings for a general thought they experienced related to 
the word “contamination”. Ratings were made at three time-points: immediately prior to 
completion of the CMDT, immediately following completion of the CMDT, and at one-
week follow-up.  
A series of 3 (time; Pre-CMDT, Pre-Intervention, Follow-up) x 3 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, Imaginal Exposure, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted to examine the change in the appraisals of belief, distress, and meaningfulness 
associated with the “contamination” thought following the CMDT task (pre-intervention) 
and at one-week follow-up (follow-up). One no intervention participant failed to 
complete appraisal ratings at pre-CMDT and one imagnal exposure participant did not 
complete appraisal ratings at follow-up; as such, they were not included in the analyses.  
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Belief Ratings (Figure J): One no intervention case was observed to have recorded 
an extremely low rating of belief associated with the “contamination” thought at pre-
CMDT. As such, she was eliminated from the analysis of belief ratings.  
There was a significant difference between groups in their belief ratings at pre-
CMDT, such that baseline verbal repetition ratings of belief were lower than imaginal 
exposure ratings, F (1, 82) = 6.01, p < .05, MSE = 372.30. There was an overall main 
effect of time, F (2, 81) = 9.70, p < .001, MSE = 113.21, but no time by group interaction, 
F (2, 81) = 1.43, p = .23, MSE = 113.21. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition 
revealed a significant increase in belief ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 
82) = 9.69, p < .01, MSE = 67.45; and a significant decrease in ratings from pre-
intervention to follow-up, F (1, 82) = 8.22, p < .01, MSE = 136.06. For imaginal 
exposure, there was a significant decrease in ratings from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 
82) = 7.79, p < .01, MSE = 136.12; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 82) = 
11.03, p = .001, MSE = 136.06.   
Distress Ratings (Figure K): There was a significant difference betwen groups in 
their distress ratings at pre-CMDT, such that baseline verbal repetition ratings of distress 
were lower than imaginal exposure ratings, F (1, 83) = 4.81, p < .05, MSE = 582.60. 
There was an overall main effect of time, F (2, 82) = 7.55, p = .001, MSE = 228.32, in the 
reduction of distress, but no significant time by group interaction, F (2, 82) = 1.35, p = 
.26, MSE = 228.32. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a trend towards 
an increase in ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 83) = 3.62, p = .06, MSE 
= 173.32, and a significant decrease in ratings from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 
83) = 9.94, p < .01, MSE = 208.95. For imaginal exposure, there was a significa t 
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decrease in ratings from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 83) = 4.89, p < .05, MSE = 
302.68; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 83) = 9.26, p < .01, MSE = 208.95. 
Meaningfulness Ratings (Figure L): There was a significant difference betwen 
groups in their meaningfulness ratings at pre-CMDT, such that baseline verbal repetition 
ratings were lower than imaginal exposure ratings, F (1, 83) = 4.26, p < .05, MSE = 
609.46. There was an overall main effect of time, F (2, 82) = 5.78, p < .01, MSE = 
200.21, in the reduction of meaningfulness, but no significant time by group interaction, 
F (2, 82) = 1.93, p = .11, MSE = 200.21. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition 
revealed a trend towards an increase in ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 
83) = 3.44, p = .07, MSE = 148.27. There was also a trend towards a decrease in ratings 
from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 83) = 3.50, p = .07, MSE = 249.53; and a significant 
decrease in ratings from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 83) = 13.41, p < .001, MSE = 
202.84. For imaginal exposure, there was a trend towards a decrease in ratings from pre-
CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 83) = 3.16, p = .08, MSE = 249.53; and a significant decrease 
in ratings from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 83) = 5.57, p < .01, MSE = 202.84.   
Overall, an examination of the change in appraisal ratings of the general 
“contamination” thought revealed a trend for a slight increase in appraisals, from pre-
CMDT to pre-intervention, for the verbal repetition group. There was also a significant 
reduction in appraisals, from pre-CMDT to follow-up, for only the imaginal exposure 
group, and there was a significant reduction in appr isals, from pre-intervention to 
follow-up, for both the verbal repetition and imaginal exposure groups.  
Examination of Credibility Ratings 
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To determine if the reductions in belief, distress, and meaningfulness could be 
accounted for by the higher credibility ratings of the verbal repetition group, correlations 
between credibility ratings and change in visual anlogue scale appraisal ratings of belief, 
meaningfulness and distress were examined. Five diff rent changes in ratings were 
calculated: i) pre-CMDT to post-intervention, ii) pre-CMDT to follow-up, iii) pre-
intervention to post-intervention, iv) pre-interventio  to follow-up, and v) post-
intervention to follow-up. There were no significant correlations between credibility 
ratings and change in appraisals for the verbal repetition group (n = 30; all rs < .35, ps > 
.05). For the imaginal exposure group (n = 30), only 8 out of 45 correlations were 
significant (Belief ratings for thought #1: imaginal exposure credibility ratings were 
significantly correlated with the reduction from pre-intervention to post-intervention, r = 
.44, p < .05; from pre-CMDT to follow-up, r = .43, p < .05; and from pre-intervention to 
follow-up, r = .45, p < .05. Distress ratings for thought #2: imaginal exposure credibility 
ratings were significantly correlated with the reduction from pre-CMDT to post-
intervention, r = .50, p < .01; from pre-intervention to post-intervention, r = .50, p < .01; 
from pre-CMDT to follow-up, r = .49, p < .01; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, r 
= .56, p = .001. Meaningfulness ratings for thought #2: imagin l exposure credibility 
ratings were significantly correlated with the reduction from pre-intervention to post-
intervention, r = .38, p < .05).  
Examination of the above correlations revealed that t e reductions in appraisals of 
belief, distress, and meaningfulness at post-intervention and one-week follow-up were 
not related to the verbal repetition participants’ perceived credibility of the cognitive 
defusion rationale. In addition, the perceived credibility of the habituation rationale was 
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not consistently related to the changes in appraisals for the imaginal exposure 
participants.      
As a further test of whether the immediate reductions in appraisal ratings were 
influenced by the differences in credibility ratings between verbal repetition and imaginal 
exposure groups, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) by 2 (group; 
Verbal Repetition, Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted, 
with participants’ credibility ratings entered as a covariate. Seven of the nine time by 
group interactions remained statistically significant fter controlling for participants’ 
credibility ratings (Fs > 3.91, ps < .05). However, no significant time by group 
interactions were observed, after controlling for pa ticipants’ credibility ratings, for the 
contamination-related thought #3 distress ratings, F (1, 57) = 1.01, p = .32, MSE = 
256.73, or thought #3 meaningfulness ratings, F (1, 57) = 2.60, p = .11, MSE = 277.29.     
Change in PI-WSUR scores 
Change in PI-WSUR total score and subscale scores from initial selection to 
follow-up was also assessed, using a 2 (time; Initial selection, Follow-up) x 3 (group; 
Verbal Repetition, Imaginal Exposure, No Interventio ) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 7. There were no main effects or 
interactions for the Total Score or the DGC, CC, OTHS, and OIHS subscales (all Fs < 
.85, ps > .35).  For the contamination subscale, there was no main effect of time, F (1, 85) 
= .14, p = .71, MSE = 21.97; however, there was a trend towards a significa t time by 
group interaction, F (2, 85) = 2.78, p < .07, MSE = 21.97. Planned comparisons revealed 
no significant differences between groups at initial selection; however, there was a 
significant difference between verbal repetition and no intervention scores at follow-up, F 
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(1, 85) = 5.03, p < .05, MSE = 57.21, with verbal repetition scores being signif cantly 
lower than no intervention scores (Figure M).   
Tests of CMDT Hypotheses 
As stated above, in the CMDT paradigm, a semantic sa ation effect is defined as 
a statistically significant increase in RT for member decisions following 30 repetitions, 
when compared with 3 repetitions, as well as no significant increase in RT for 
nonmember decisions following 30 repetitions, when compared with 3 repetitions. It was 
hypothesized that a statistically significant semantic satiation effect would be observed 
for each of the three verbal repetition conditions (verbal repetition – neutral items; verbal 
repetition – repeated “automobile” items; verbal repetition – repeated “contamination” 
items), but no semantic satiation effect would be oserved for the three imaginal 
exposure conditions (imaginal exposure – neutral items; imaginal exposure – repeated 
“automobile” items; imaginal exposure – repeated “contamination” items). 
Forty-eight participants completed the CMDT using verbal repetition instructions 
(verbal repetition n = 33; no intervention – verbal repetition n = 15) and 45 participants 
completed the task using imaginal exposure instructions (imaginal exposure n = 30; no 
intervention – imaginal exposure n = 15). Immediately following the task, participants 
rated their ability to carry out the verbal repetition or imaginal exposure technique during 
the CMDT. There were no differences in ability betwen those assigned to complete the 
task using verbal repetition (M = 76.65, SD = 16.11) and those assigned to complete the 
task using imaginal exposure [M = 71.38, SD = 21.18; t (91) = 1.36, p = .18].  
To analyze the data obtained from the CMDT, the mean median RTs for the 
correct category membership decisions and the mean p rcentage of errors were obtained 
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for each of the following four trial types: i) 3 rep titions or “short” imagining/member 
target; ii) 3 repetitions or “short” imagining/nonme ber target; iii) 30 repetitions or 
“long” imagining/member target; and iv) 30 repetitions or “long” imagining/nonmember 
target. Separate two-way ANOVAs were conducted on the mean median RT data and the 
mean percent error data. The factors of the ANOVA for the verbal repetition conditions 
were number of repetitions (3 or 30), and the decision type (i.e., whether the target word 
was a member or nonmember of the category word). The factors of the ANOVA for the 
imaginal exposure condition were the length of time sp nt imagining the category word 
(short or long), and the decision type (member or nonmember). Post hoc comparisons 
were made for the mean median RTs and the mean percent error data for each of the four 
trial types, using two-tailed t tests. These analyses were conducted for each of the six 
different CMDT conditions: i) imaginal exposure – neutral items; ii) imaginal exposure – 
repeated “automobile” items; iii) imaginal exposure – repeated “contamination” items; 
iv) verbal repetition – neutral items; v) verbal repetition – repeated “automobile” items; 
and vi) verbal repetition – repeated “contamination” items. The mean median RTs for the 
correct category membership decisions and the mean p rcentage of errors are displayed 
in Table 8. Trials with incorrect category membership decisions were excluded from the 
analyses. Following Smith and Klein (1990), a participant’s data was excluded from a 
condition if they responded incorrectly on 50% or more of the trials in any one of the four 
trial types.  
Imaginal Exposure – Neutral Items  
Each participant completed four trial types (short imagining length/member 
target; short imagining length/nonmember target; long imagining length/member target; 
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long imagining length/nonmember target). Data from three participants contained errors 
on 50% or more trials in one or more of the trial types, and were excluded from the 
analysis.  
There was a main effect of imagining length (short ve sus long), F (1, 41) = 5.40, 
p < .05, MSE = 73 644.40, and a trend towards a significant main effect for the decision 
type (member versus nonmember), F (1, 41) = 3.83, p = .05, MSE = 73 644.40. The 
interaction of decision type and imagining length did not approach significance, F (1, 41) 
= .01, p = .91, MSE = 73 644.40. However, as this task was designed to tes  for semantic 
satiation effects, relevant comparisons were made, ev n though the interaction was not 
significant (see Smith and Klein, p. 854, Footnote 1), following the data analytic strategy 
of previous experiments incorporating the category membership decision task (Lewis & 
Ellis, 2000; Lindquist et al., 2006; Smith, 1984; Smith & Klein, 1990). Two-tailed t tests 
showed that participants were significantly slower to make member decisions following a 
long imagining length (M = 868.18, SD = 261.45) than following a short imagining 
length [M = 766.02, SD = 241.78; t (41) = 5.12, p < .001]. They were also slower to make 
nonmember decisions following a long imagining length (M = 945.30, SD = 320.14) than 
following a short imagining length [M = 852.83, SD = 255.49; t (41) = 4.08, p < .001]. 
Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean percent rror data revealed no main 
effect for type of decision, F (1, 41) = 1.12, p = .29, MSE = 99.21. There was also no 
reliable difference in error rates between decision times as a function of the length of 
imagining, F (1, 41) = 1.43, p =.23, MSE = 99.21. However, the interaction of decision 
type and imagining length did approach significance, F (1, 41) = 3.62, p = .06, MSE = 
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99.21. Post hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference in errors between only the 
long/member trials (10.0%) and short/member trials [5.2%; t (41) = 2.89, p < .01]. 
The above pattern of results (an increase in RTs for member and nonmember 
targets following long imagining) appears to represent a general slowing of response time 
following a long imagining length, rather than a semantic satiation effect (which is 
evidenced by a significant increase in RTs for membr, ut not nonmember, targets). 
Imaginal Exposure – Repeated “Automobile” Items 
Data from five participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. There was a main effect for 
decision type, F (1, 39) = 5.83, p < .05, MSE = 47 096.75, with participants responding to 
nonmember decisions slower than to member decisions. There was a significant main 
effect for length of imagining, F (1, 39) = 5.83, p < .05, MSE = 47 096.75, with 
participants responding slower following a long imagining length than following a short 
imagining length. The interaction of decision type and length of imagining did not 
approach significance, F (1, 39) = .56, p = .46, MSE = 47 096.75. Two-tailed t tests 
showed that participants were significantly slower to make member decisions following a 
long imagining length (M = 810.78, SD = 255.93) than following a short imagining 
length [M = 704.13, SD = 175.88; t (39) = 4.00, p < .001]. There was also a trend towards 
a significant difference between nonmember decisions f llowing a long imagining length 
(M = 868.58, SD = 204.82) and following a short imagining length (M = 812.58, SD = 
223.61; t (39) = 1.99, p = .05). Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean 
percent error data revealed no main effect for typeof decision, F (1, 39) = .44, p = .51, 
MSE = 62.79. There was, however, a significant main effect for length of imagining, F 
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(1, 39) = 3.97, p < .05, MSE = 62.79. The interaction of decision type and imaginin  
length did not approach significance, F (1, 39) = .44, p = .51, MSE = 62.79. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed a significant difference in the mean percent error rates when 
comparing nonmember trials with a short imagining length (3.3%) with member and 
nonmember trials with a long imagining length [both 6.7%; t (39) = 2.15, p < .05]. These 
results suggest the occurrence of a general slowing of response following long periods of 
imagining, and as hypothesized, no semantic satiation effect was observed. 
Imaginal Exposure – Repeated “Contamination” Items 
Data from five participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. There was no main effect of 
imagining length, F (1, 39) = 2.22, p = .14, MSE = 74 042.77, or decision type, F (1, 39) 
= 2.47, p = .12, MSE = 74 042.77. The interaction of decision type and imagining length 
did not approach significance, F (1, 39) = .09, p = .76, MSE = 74 042.77. Two-tailed t 
tests showed that participants were significantly slower to make member decisions 
following a long imagining length (M = 864.38, SD = 249.47) than following a short 
imagining length [M = 813.49, SD = 248.65; t (39) = 2.15, p < .05]. They were also 
slower to make nonmember decisions following a long imagining length (M = 945.15, SD 
= 326.34) than following a short imagining length [M = 867.85, SD = 256.14; t (39) = 
2.71, p < .05]. Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean percent error data 
revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 1.90, ps > .17). As such, 
these results are suggestive of a general slowing of response following a long imagining 
length, and as hypothesized, no semantic satiation effect was observed. 
Verbal Repetition – Neutral Items 
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There was a significant main effect for the type of decision (member versus 
nonmember), F (1, 47) = 4.87, p < .05, MSE = 35 385.85. There was no significant main 
effect for number of repetitions, F (1, 47) = 1.43, p =.23, MSE = 35 385.85, and the 
interaction of decision type and number of repetitions did not approach significance, F (1, 
47) = .12, p = .73, MSE = 35 385.85. Two-tailed t tests showed that participants were 
significantly slower to make member decisions following 30 repetitions (M = 732.16, SD 
= 187.69) than following 3 repetitions [M = 690.38, SD = 162.93; t (47) = 3.27, p < .01]. 
In contrast, they were not significantly slower responding to nonmember targets 
following 30 repetitions (M = 782.79, SD = 190.06) than following 3 repetitions [M = 
759.55, SD = 208.92; t (47) = 1.66, p = .10]. Examination of the two-way ANOVA for 
the mean percent error data revealed a significant m in effect for type of decision, F (1, 
47) = 13.82, p < .001, MSE = 34.00, with significantly more errors being made for 
nonmember than member trials. There was no reliable diff rence between decision times 
as a function of the number of repetitions, F (1, 47) = 1.54, p =.22, MSE = 34.00, and the 
interaction of decision type and number of repetitions did not approach significance, F (1, 
47) = .32, p = .57, MSE = 34.00.  
Keeping in mind that the interaction was not statisically significant, the above 
pattern of findings appears to support the semantic sa ation hypothesis. Participants were 
slower to correctly decide that a target word is a member of a category following 30 
repetitions than following 3 repetitions, but they were not significantly slower for 
nonmember decisions following 30 repetitions than following 3 repetitions. 
Verbal Repetition – Repeated “Automobile” Items 
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Data from four participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. There was a trend towards a 
significant main effect for decision type, F (1, 43) = 3.60, p = .06, MSE = 31 392.65, with 
participants responding somewhat slower to nonmember decisions than to member 
decisions. There was a significant main effect for number of repetitions, F (1, 43) = 7.09, 
p < .01, MSE = 31 392.65, with participants responding slower following 30 repetitions 
than following 3 repetitions. The interaction of decision type and number of repetitions 
did not approach significance, F (1, 43) = .56, p = .46, MSE = 31 392.65. Two-tailed t 
tests showed that participants were not significantly slower to make member decisions 
following 30 repetitions (M = 712.59, SD = 171.42) than following 3 repetitions [M = 
681.90, SD = 153.18; t (43) = 1.67, p = .10]. There was, however, a significant differenc 
in RTs for nonmember targets following 3 repetitions (M = 733.03, SD = 161.16) and 
following 30 repetitions [M = 803.67, SD = 216.23; t (43) = 3.65, p = .001]. Examination 
of the two-way ANOVA for the mean percent error data revealed no main effects or 
interactions (all Fs < 2.26, ps > .12). As such, no semantic satiation effect was observed 
for this condition, contrary to hypotheses. 
Verbal Repetition – Repeated “Contamination” Items 
Data from four participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. There was no main effect for 
either decision type, F (1, 43) = .005, p = .94, MSE = 44 373.94, or number of repetitions, 
F (1, 43) = 1.58, p = .211, MSE = 44 373.94, and there was no interaction between 
decision type and number of repetitions, F (1, 43) < .001, p =.99, MSE = 44 373.94. Post 
hoc comparisons revealed that participants were significantly slower in responding to 
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member target words following 30 repetitions (M = 796.95, SD = 226.55) than following 
3 repetitions [M = 757.38, SD = 217.39; t (43) = 2.05, p < .05]. Unexpectedly, 
participants were also slower to respond to nonmember target words following 30 
repetitions (M = 794.89, SD = 203.23) than following 3 repetitions [M = 754.75, SD = 
193.93; t (43) = 2.23, p < .05]. Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean 
percent error data revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < .18, ps > 
.67). As such, no semantic satiation effect was observed for this condition, contrary to 
hypotheses. 
Unexpectedly, the above results revealed that no semantic satiation effect 
occurred during the conditions where one of two category words (“automobile” or 
“contamination”) was verbally repeated 30 times on each trial. It is possible, however, 
that a semantic satiation effect was not found in these two verbal repetition conditions 
because of the way the task was designed. More specifically, in these two conditions, 
each of the different member and nonmember target words were presented on three 
separate trials. It is possible that participants responded differently to the target words on 
the repeated trials than to the target word on the first time it was presented, which might 
obscure any semantic satiation effects. In order to de ermine if this was the case, the 
above analyses were repeated for each of the four conditions that included repeated items 
(imaginal exposure – “automobile” items; imaginal exposure – “contamination” items; 
verbal repetition – “automobile” items; verbal repetition – “contamination” items). This 
time, however, only the trials in which a novel category-target word pair was introduced 
were included in the analyses, and any repeated trials were excluded from the analyses. 
As there were now only three trials of each trial type (instead of nine trials for each trial 
 53 
type in the original analyses), the mean RTs for each trial type, as well as the mean 
percentage of errors, were calculated and subjected to separate two-way ANOVAs. 
Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 9, and the results of the analyses 
are described below. 
Imaginal Exposure “Automobile” Items without Repeated Trials 
Data from five participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. In addition, one participant was 
observed to have an extremely long RT on at least one of the trial types, and was 
eliminated from the analysis. There was a significant main effect for length of imagining, 
F (1, 38) = 6.06, p < .05, MSE = 65 342.34, and a trend towards a significant main effect 
for decision type, F (1, 38) = 3.16, p = .08, MSE = 65 342.34. However, there was no 
significant interaction of decision type and length of imagining, F (1, 38) = .86, p = .36, 
MSE = 65 342.34. Two-tailed t tests showed that there was no significant difference 
between member decisions following a long imagining length (M = 890.99, SD = 273.91) 
and following a short imagining length [M = 828.11, SD = 237.76; t (38) = 1.33, p = .19]. 
However, participants were significantly slower to respond to nonmember decisions 
following a long imagining length (M = 1001.58, SD = 298.69) than following a short 
imagining length [M = 863.02, SD = 201.49; t (38) = 2.97, p < .01]. Examination of the 
two-way ANOVA for the mean percentage error data revealed a significant main effect 
for length of imagining, F (1, 38) = 5.12, p < .05, MSE = 229.21. There was no main 
effect for type of decision, F (1, 38) = .76, p = .39, MSE = 229.21, and no significant 
interaction between decision type and number of repetitions, F (1, 38) = .27, p = .60, 
MSE = 229.21. Post hoc comparisons revealed a significa t difference in mean percent 
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error rates only between member trials with a short (M = 5.83, SD = 12.81) and a long 
imagining length [M = 12.49, SD = 17.99; t (38) = 2.24, p < .05]. As no significant 
increase was observed for member trials following a long imagining length versus a short 
imagining length, no semantic satiation effect was ob erved for this condition. 
Imaginal Exposure “Contamination” Items without Repeated Trials 
Data from five participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. There was a trend towards a 
significant main effect for length of imagining, F (1, 39) = 3.59, p = .06, MSE = 94 
080.26. There was no main effect for decision type, F (1, 39) = .56, p = .46, MSE = 94 
080.26, and the interaction of decision type and legth of imagining did not approach 
significance, F (1, 39) = .05, p = .83, MSE = 94 080.26. Two-tailed t tests showed that 
participants were significantly slower to make membr decisions following a long 
imagining length (M = 1004.84, SD = 327.73) than following a short imagining length (M 
= 902.55, SD = 304.75; t (39) = 2.45, p < .05). There was also a trend towards a 
significant difference between nonmember decisions f llowing a long imagining length 
(M = 1030.80, SD = 294.69) and following a short imagining length [M = 949.20, SD = 
298.66; t (39) = 1.78, p = .08]. Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean 
percent error data revealed a trend towards a significa t main effect for type of decision, 
F (1, 39) = 3.05, p = .08, MSE = 275.63. There was no main effect for length of 
imagining, F (1, 39) = .03, p = .87, MSE = 275.63, and no significant interaction of 
decision type and number of repetitions, F (1, 39) = .03, p = .88, MSE = 275.63. 
Although the difference between nonmember decisions f llowing short and long 
imagining lengths did not reach statistical significance, these results appear to better 
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reflect a general slowing following a long imagining length, rather than a semantic 
satiation effect. 
Verbal Repetition “Automobile” Items without Repeatd Trials 
Data from four participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. In addition, one participant was 
observed to have extremely long RTs on at least one of the trial types. As such, they were 
eliminated from the analysis. There was a main effect or decision type, F (1, 42) = 4.64, 
p < .05, MSE = 49 708.08, and a main effect for number of repetitions, F (1, 42) = 9.57, p 
< .01, MSE = 49 708.08. However, the interaction between decision type and number of 
repetitions did not approach significance, F (1, 42) = .15, p = .70, MSE = 49 708.08. 
Two-tailed t tests showed that participants were significantly slower to make member 
decisions following 30 repetitions (M = 807.77, SD = 209.42) than following 3 
repetitions [M = 721.52, SD = 167.83; t (42) = 2.86, p < .001]. In contrast, participants 
were not significantly slower to make nonmember decisions following 30 repetitions (M 
= 899.91, SD = 270.77) than following 3 repetitions [M = 839.72, SD = 231.29; t (42) = 
1.45, p = .15]. Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean percent error data 
revealed no main effects or interactions (all Fs < 1.23, ps > .26). As such, this pattern of 
results is indicative of a statistically significant semantic satiation effect. 
Verbal Repetition “Contamination” Items without Repeated Trials  
Data from four participants contained errors on 50% or more trials in one or more 
of the trial types, and were excluded from the analysis. In addition, three participants 
were observed to have extremely long RTs on at leasone of the trial types (i.e., z scores 
that were greater than 3 and discontinuous from the rest of the distribution). As such, they 
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were eliminated from the analysis. There was no main effect for either decision type, F 
(1, 40) = .06, p = .80, MSE = 62 479.45, or number of repetitions, F (1, 40) = .79, p = .38, 
MSE = 62 479.45, and there was no interaction between d cision type and number of 
repetitions, F (1, 40) = .75, p = .39, MSE = 62 479.45. Two-tailed t tests showed that 
participants were somewhat slower to make member decisions following 30 repetitions 
(M = 886.71, SD = 258.76) than following 3 repetitions [M = 818.15, SD = 261.55; t (40) 
= 1.83, p = .07], although this difference was not statistically significant. There was no 
significant difference between mean RTs for nonmember trials following 3 (M = 861.82, 
SD = 243.42) and 30 repetitions [M = 862.69, SD = 235.17; t (40) = .03, p = .98]. 
Examination of the two-way ANOVA for the mean percent rror data revealed no main 
effects or interactions (all Fs < .46, ps > .50). Whereas the above pattern of results is 
suggestive of a semantic satiation effect, it appears that there was too much variation in 
RTs for the mean difference between member decisions following 3 and 30 repetitions to 
reach statistical significance. As such, no statistically significant semantic satiation effect 
can be said to have occurred. 
Overall, there was partial support for the CMDT hypotheses. As hypothesized, a 
statistically significant semantic satiation effect was observed for the verbal repetition – 
neutral items condition, but not the imaginal exposure – neutral items condition. There 
was also no semantic satiation effect observed for the two imaginal exposure – repeated 
items conditions. Contrary to hypotheses, however, no semantic satiation effect was 
observed for the two verbal repetition – repeated it ms conditions. When the repeated 
items data was re-analyzed with the repeated trialsremoved, a semantic satiation effect 
was observed for the verbal repetition – “automobile” items condition, as hypothesized, 
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but not the verbal repetition – “contamination” items, contrary to hypotheses. Finally, as 
hypothesized, no semantic satiation effect was observed for imaginal exposure – 
“automobile” items, or imaginal exposure – “contaminat on” items conditions when the 
repeated trials were removed. 
Semantic Satiation and Appraisal Correlations  
A semantic satiation score was derived for each participant, for each CMDT 
condition, by subtracting their mean median RT for the 3 repetitions (short imagining 
length)/member trial type from the 30 repetitions (long imagining length)/member trial 
type. The relation between semantic satiation score and belief, distress, and 
meaningfulness appraisal ratings, at post-intervention and one-week follow-up, was then 
assessed via Pearson's correlation coefficient. Tables 10-17 display the correlation 
matrices for the verbal repetition, imaginal exposure, no intervention – verbal repetition, 
and no intervention – imaginal exposure groups. A negative correlation between the two 
variables (i.e., as semantic satiation increases, appraisal ratings decrease) would suggest 
that the propensity to produce semantic satiation through the verbal repetition or imaginal 
exposure of category words is associated with reductions in the negative appraisals 
towards contamination-related thoughts.  
As reported above, a statistically significant semantic satiation effect was 
observed for only the verbal repetition – neutral items condition and the verbal repetition 
– “automobile” items condition with the repeated trials removed. Given that these two 
CMDT conditions were the only conditions for which a semantic satiation effect was 
observed, it was hypothesized that the semantic satiation scores for only these two 
 58 
conditions would be significantly negatively correlated with post-intervention and 
follow-up appraisal ratings.   
Semantic satiation scores were obtained for each verbal repetition participant, and 
were correlated with participants’ post-interventio and follow-up appraisal ratings. 
Examination of the correlations revealed no significant correlations between semantic 
satiation scores and post-intervention appraisal ratings, with the exception of one 
correlation (Belief ratings for contamination-relatd thought #1, r = .42, p < .05), which 
was in the opposite direction (Table 10). Approximately half of the other post-
intervention correlations for neutral items and “automobile” items, although not 
statistically significant, were in the hypothesized negative direction (with 8 of 18 
correlations larger than -.20). However, the averag correlation was only -.14.  
Examination of the correlations between semantic saation scores for neutral 
items and “automobile” items, and appraisal ratings for verbal repetition participants at 
follow-up revealed some evidence for a significant relation between these variables, with 
7 out of 24 correlations reaching statistical signif cance. In addition, the majority of the 
correlations, while not statistically significant, were in the expected negative direction 
(with 19 of 24 correlations larger than -.20; see Table 11), and overall, the average 
correlation was -.28. 
No statistically significant semantic satiation effect was observed following 
verbal repetition for “contamination” items condition (with the repeated trials removed). 
Not surprisingly, no significant relation was found between semantic satiation scores and 
appraisal ratings, at either post-intervention or follow-up, except for the Belief ratings for 
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the “contamination” thought at follow-up, which was in the opposite direction (r  = .41, p 
< .05).       
Overall, there was no significant relation between d rived semantic satiation 
scores and appraisal ratings for the imaginal exposure group, either at post-intervention 
(Table 12) or at follow-up (Table 13; all rs < .38, ps > .07). This was not surprising, 
given that no semantic satiation effect was observed for any imaginal exposure condition.  
Examination of the relation between semantic satiation scores and appraisal 
ratings for the no intervention – verbal repetition (Tables 14 and 15) and no intervention 
– imaginal exposure (Tables 16 and 17) groups reveal d few statistically significant 
correlations (only 5 out of 63 correlations for theno intervention – verbal repetition 
group, and 6 out of 63 correlations for the no intervention – imaginal exposure group 
reached statistical significance). For both groups, however, the overall pattern of results 
was suggestive of a positive relation between the variables (i.e., higher semantic satiation 
scores were associated with higher appraisal ratings).  
During the CMDT, the no intervention participants were randomly assigned to 
complete the task using verbal repetition or imaginl exposure. As there were no 
significant differences between these two groups (see above), their data were combined 
to form the present no intervention group. Separately, however, the data from these no 
intervention subgroups (no intervention – verbal repetition and no intervention – imaginal 
exposure) provide an opportunity to examine whether t  mere repetition of the word 
“contamination”, or the repeated imaginal exposure of a thought involving 
contamination, without a cognitive defusion or habituation rationale, is effective in 
promoting a reappraisal of the “contamination” thought. A series of 3 (time; Pre-CMDT, 
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Pre-Intervention, Follow-up) x 2 (group; No Intervention – Verbal Repetition, No 
Intervention – Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to 
examine the change in appraisal ratings for the “contamination” thought (Table 18)2. 
There were no significant main effects or interactions present (all Fs < 1.08, ps > .36). 
Planned comparisons revealed no significant differences between no intervention – verbal 
repetition and no intervention – imaginal exposure at ither pre-CMDT, pre-intervention, 
or follow-up (all ts < 1.22, ps > .24), and there were no significant changes overtime for 
either group (all ts < 1.50, ps > .16). 
Discussion 
In the present exploratory study, the use of the verbal repetition intervention was 
significantly more effective than either imaginal exposure or no intervention in the 
immediate reduction of appraisals of belief, distres, and meaningfulness associated with 
contamination-related thoughts. For participants receiving verbal repetition, there were 
significant reductions of each of the appraisal ratings, from pre-intervention to post-
intervention. On average, there was an immediate 19% reduction in belief ratings, a 27% 
reduction in distress ratings, and a 28% reduction in meaningfulness ratings. In contrast, 
there were no significant reductions in appraisals, from pre-intervention to post-
intervention, for either the imaginal exposure group (on average, a 2% reduction in belief 
ratings, a 2% reduction in distress ratings, and a 4% reduction in meaningfulness ratings) 
or the no intervention group (on average, a 2% reduction in belief ratings, a 4% reduction 
                                                
2 One no intervention – verbal repetition participant did not attend follow-up; as such, they were excluded 
from the analyses. One no intervention – verbal repetition participant recorded an extremely low rating of 
belief; as such, they were eliminated from the analysis of belief ratings. One no intervention – imaginal 
exposure participant did not attend follow-up, and o e participant did not complete visual analogue scale 
ratings for the “contamination” thought at pre-CMDT; as such, they were excluded from the analyses. 
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in distress ratings, and a 5% reduction in meaningful ess ratings). These results suggest 
that this particular cognitive defusion technique, along with the appropriate rationale, 
may be a useful intervention for individuals to employ in order to promote an immediate 
reappraisal of distressing thoughts.  
Although no immediate reductions in belief, distress, or meaningfulness appraisal 
ratings were observed following imaginal exposure, in comparison with the pre-
intervention ratings, there was a significant reduction in these appraisals at one-week 
follow-up. This finding is consistent with a large literature supporting the use of exposure 
in the treatment of obsessional problems (Foa, Franklin, & Kozak, 1998), although the 
fact that it was a “sleeper” effect was unexpected. One explanation for these findings is 
that imaginal exposure is likely to be a distressing task for participants to complete. As 
such, it is possible that imaginal exposure participants were somewhat disturbed 
immediately after the experience, with the result being that the beneficial effect of 
imaginal exposure was not apparent at post-intervention. In other words, one explanation 
is that there was a delay before imaginal exposure pa ticipants were able to experience 
any reductions in their appraisals towards the contamination-related thoughts.   
Overall, there was a differential pattern of change in appraisal ratings of 
contamination-related thoughts following verbal repetition and imaginal exposure. From 
pre-CMDT (baseline) to post-intervention, the verbal repetition intervention resulted in 
significant reductions in belief and meaningfulness ratings for two out of three 
contamination-related thoughts. There was also a significant decrease in distress ratings 
for all three thoughts. In contrast, there were no immediate reductions in appraisals 
following imaginal exposure, although from pre-CMDT to follow-up there were 
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significant reductions in the belief and distress ratings for two out of three contamination-
related thoughts.  Examination of the change in appraisal ratings from baseline (pre-
CMDT) to follow-up revealed no significant differences between verbal repetition and 
imaginal exposure in terms of their respective abilities to reduce appraisals of belief, 
distress, and meaningfulness. Verbal repetition was significantly more effective than no 
intervention only in the reduction of distress and meaningfulness appraisals of 
contamination-related thought #2.  Imaginal exposure was significantly more effective 
than no intervention only in the belief appraisals for contamination-related thought #1. 
Interestingly, the largest reductions in appraisal ratings for verbal repetition 
occurred immediately following implementation of the intervention, whereas for imaginal 
exposure, there were no immediate reductions, but significant reductions were observed 
from post-intervention to follow-up for the distress and meaningfulness appraisals of one 
out of three contamination-related thoughts. One implication of these findings is that 
verbal repetition, with its explicit metacognitive emphasis, could potentially be used by 
individuals with OCD as an effective way to immediately view their obsessive thoughts 
in a different context. Verbal repetition may be one way that individuals with OCD to 
distance themselves from their obsessive thoughts, through the realization that their 
anxiety-provoking obsessive thoughts are also “just thoughts” that do not necessarily 
have any significance (Hayes et al., 1999). The verbal repetition intervention could also 
potentially be used by clinicians in the beginning stages of treatment for OCD, as a way 
to teach individuals with OCD to learn how to immediately reappraise their obsessive 
thoughts as less believable, less meaningful, and less distressing.    
 63 
The immediate reduction in the appraisals of belief in contamination-related 
thoughts following verbal repetition supports the recent experimental findings of the 
effectiveness of verbal repetition in reducing the belief in negative thoughts and 
evaluations about the self (Masuda et al., 2004). In addition, these findings support the 
clinical research trials which have found significant reductions in the belief associated 
with negative thoughts following both brief (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 
2006a, 2006b) and full Acceptance and Commitment Therapy interventions (Twohig et 
al., 2006; Zettle & Hayes, 1986) 
The present study found that verbal repetition result d in an immediate decrease 
in the distress associated with contamination-related thoughts. Future research should 
seek to determine if the addition of verbal repetition to exposure and response 
prevention-based treatment of OCD can significantly reduce the treatment refusal, 
treatment noncompliance, and drop-out rates commonly f und in exposure and response 
prevention treatment outcome studies (e.g., Stanley & Turner, 1995). 
Comparison of the credibility ratings given by verbal repetition and imaginal 
exposure participants suggest that individuals withhig  levels of contamination-related 
OCD symptoms are more likely to favor a cognitive defusion rationale than the 
habituation rationale typically given to individuals with OCD to explain the purpose for 
engaging in exposure and response prevention (e.g.,Foa, 1991). In addition, the 
participants receiving verbal repetition plus a cognitive defusion rationale reported 
significant reductions in belief, distress, and meaningfulness immediately following the 
exercise; these immediate reductions were not evident n the imaginal exposure plus 
habituation rationale or no intervention groups. These results support the experimental 
 64 
finding that, compared with brief exposure and respon e prevention with a habituation 
rationale, brief exposure and response prevention wth a metacognitive rationale (similar 
to a cognitive defusion rationale) resulted in signif cantly greater reductions in 
anxiety/distress, belief in the obsessive thought and urge to neutralize in a subsequent 
behavioural assessment test (Fisher & Wells, 2005). 
A central goal of the cognitive defusion techniques sed in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy is to help individuals become more aware of the process of 
thinking, and to “defuse” from the cognitive content (Hayes et al., 1999). The present 
findings provide additional evidence to previous exp rimental research (Masuda et al., 
2004; unpublished manuscript) that verbal repetition is an effective cognitive defusion 
technique for achieving this goal. The significant decrease in the meaningfulness of 
contamination-related thoughts following verbal repetition suggests that this particular 
cognitive defusion technique is effective in temporarily disrupting the literal meanings of 
contamination-related words so that they are reappraised as less meaningful, as was 
suggested over ninety years ago by Tichener (1916).  
In a recent review of several prominent cognitive th ories of OCD, Purdon (in 
press) summarized some suggestions originally proposed by Paul Salkovskis (e.g., 
Salkovskis, 1985), stating that “(t)reatment refusal and dropout may be decreased 
substantially if the obsession is ‘detoxified’ in adv nce through re-appraisal of the 
thought’s meaning”. Given that a large reduction in the meaningfulness appraisals of 
contamination-related thoughts was observed immediat ly following the use of verbal 
repetition, this intervention might be a helpful addition to existing CBT and exposure and 
response prevention treatments for OCD.  
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The imaginal exposure intervention caused a significant reduction in belief 
ratings, for two of the three contamination-related thoughts, when examining the change 
in ratings from pre-CMDT to follow-up. In addition, from pre-intervention to follow-up, 
there were significant reductions in the ratings of belief for all three thoughts. These 
unexpected findings support previous research demonstrating an improvement in 
unrealistic beliefs following exposure and response prevention without any direct 
cognitive intervention (Ito et al., 1995; Whittal et al., 2005). In addition, whereas no 
statistically significant reductions were observed for meaningfulness appraisals from pre-
CMDT to follow-up in the imaginal exposure group, there were significant reductions in 
meaningfulness when examining the change in ratings from pre-intervention to follow-
up.  
There were no significant differences for PI-WSUR contamination subscale 
scores for verbal repetition, imaginal exposure, and no intervention groups at the initial 
selection of the participants. At follow-up, however, there was a statistically significant 
difference in PI-WSUR contamination subscale scores between the verbal repetition and 
no intervention groups. Although the change in scores for each group was not statistically 
significant, an examination of the mean scores at initial selection and follow-up revealed 
that there was a slight increase for the no intervention group (from 21.29 to 23.36) at 
follow-up, and a slight decrease in scores for both the verbal repetition (from 19.93 to 
18.90) and imaginal exposure (from 22.37 to 20.53) groups. The follow-up PI-WSUR 
was administered immediately following the exposure to the contamination-related 
thoughts and subsequent visual analogue scale appraisal ratings. Although speculative, it 
is possible that this exposure produced an aversive esponse in the no intervention group 
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which caused the slight increase in contamination subscale scores. In contrast, the verbal 
repetition and imaginal exposure interventions may h ve provided a psychological 
“buffer” against this increase, resulting in a slight decrease in contamination subscale 
scores for these two groups at follow-up. 
All participants, as part of the CMDT, either verbally repeated the word 
“contamination” or imagined their identified “contamination” thought for a large number 
of CMDT trials. As such, the data from the no intervention – verbal repetition and no 
intervention – imaginal exposure subgroups provided a way to examine the effects of 
repeated verbal repetition and imaginal exposure practice, without an accompanying 
treatment rationale, on the reappraisal of a thought related to the word “contamination.” 
Interestingly, there were no significant changes in appraisal ratings either immediately 
following the CMDT or at one-week follow-up, for the no intervention – verbal repetition 
and no intervention – imaginal exposure subgroups. In addition, an examination of the 
appraisal ratings made by the imaginal exposure group f r their “contamination” thought 
revealed no significant changes immediately following imaginal exposure, and there was 
a tendency towards an increase in appraisal ratings for the verbal repetition group 
immediately following the CMDT.  
The above findings suggest that the repeated practice of verbal repetition and 
imaginal exposure on its own, without a plausible treatment rationale has no beneficial 
effect on the reappraisal of contamination-related thoughts. Previous research has found 
that viewing a cognitive defusion rationale without the subsequent completion of the 
verbal repetition technique, was significantly less ffective than the rationale plus 20 
seconds of verbal repetition in reducing the belief and distress in self-relevant negative 
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thoughts (Masuda et al., unpublished manuscript). Taken together, these findings suggest 
that the combination of a cognitive defusion rationale plus the completion of the verbal 
repetition technique is necessary for beneficial effects to occur, and that each component 
in isolation is not enough to promote a significant reappraisal of negative thoughts. This 
is in accordance with a theoretical assumption of Relational Frame Theory that 
establishing behaviour by direct verbal rules (e.g., viewing the cognitive defusion 
rationale) is counterproductive if the problem is related to excessive verbal control. 
However, direct experiencing without a verbal framework (e.g., merely repeating a word 
over and over again) would also be expected to be less than optimal given that no 
framework has been established for interpreting the experience. 
Discussion of CMDT Results 
The semantic satiation effect demonstrated by Smith (1984) using a category 
membership decision task, and defined as a significa t increase in RT for member, but 
not nonmember, targets following 30 repetitions, was replicated in the present study. As 
hypothesized, for neutral category and target words, verbally repeating a category word 
30 times significantly slowed the participant’s response to categorizing a target word as a 
member of the repeated category. This finding is taken as evidence of a decreased 
accessibility of semantic information related to the repeated word.  
When the repeated target trials were excluded from the analysis, a statistically 
significant semantic satiation effect was also found for the verbal repetition – 
“automobile” items condition. The pattern of result for the verbal repetition – 
“contamination” items condition, though not reaching statistical significance, was 
consistent with the typical pattern of results suggestive of the presence of a semantic 
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satiation effect. It is possible that the inclusion of more trials may have led to a decrease 
in the variability of RT scores, resulting in the man RT difference between 30 
repetitions/member and 3 repetitions/member trial types becoming statistically 
significant. Overall, the present results are consistent with the large body of research 
which has reliably found a semantic satiation effect ollowing verbal repetition, using a 
category membership decision paradigm (for a review, see Black, 2003).  
In contrast with the above findings, imaginal exposure during the CMDT did not 
produce a semantic satiation effect. Instead, the prolonged imagining of a category word 
appears to have caused a more general slowing of response when categorizing both 
member and nonmember target words. This was the patt rn which emerged for all 
imaginal exposure conditions, except for the imaginl exposure – “automobile” items 
condition with the repeated trials excluded. However, although a significant increase in 
RT for member targets following a long imagining length was not observed, there were 
significantly more errors committed on this trial type, suggesting a speed-accuracy trade-
off. It is likely that had participants been more accurate in this trial type, the mean RT 
would have been significantly slower, thus replicating the pattern observed for the other 
imaginal exposure conditions. It is unknown why this specific pattern of errors emerged 
in this condition. In the present study, no consistent pattern of error rates emerged for 
either the various verbal repetition or imaginal exposure conditions; examination of the 
error rates reported in previous experiments (Lindquist et al., 2006; Pilotti et al., 1997; 
Smith, 1984; Smith & Klein, 1990) also reveals an inconsistent pattern for the percentage 
of errors on each trial type.     
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For verbal repetition participants, the correlations between semantic satiation 
scores and ratings of belief, distress, and meaningfulness were, overall, not statistically 
significant. For the two conditions where a statistically significant semantic satiation 
effect occurred, the correlations were largely in the predicted direction, with larger 
semantic satiation scores being somewhat associated with lower appraisal ratings at 
follow-up. However, as the majority of the correlations did not reach statistical 
significance, caution must be taken to not over-interpret these results. As mentioned 
previously, there were no significant correlations b erved between verbal repetition 
participants’ satiation scores for “contamination” items and appraisal ratings. This is not 
surprising, given that a statistically significant semantic satiation effect was not observed 
for this CMDT condition. 
Examination of the correlations between the semantic satiation scores and 
appraisal ratings for the no intervention – verbal epetition and no intervention – imaginal 
exposure groups revealed an interesting pattern. Whereas the majority of the correlations 
were not statistically significant, for both groups the overall pattern was that of a positive 
relation between semantic satiation scores and belief, distress, and meaningfulness 
appraisals (i.e., higher semantic satiation scores were associated with higher appraisal 
ratings). An important caveat, however, is that dueto the small sample sizes, 
interpretation of these correlations must be made with caution. One tentative explanation 
for these results is that the semantic satiation accompanying verbal repetition, and the 
absorption occurring following a long length of imaginal exposure, without any rationale 
to accompany it, had a negative impact on subsequent appraisal ratings. This is in 
accordance with the related finding of a significant increase in some appraisal ratings 
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immediately following the CMDT (pre-intervention) in the verbal repetition and imaginal 
exposure groups. As stated above, however, this is speculative and these results would 
need to be replicated in a larger sample in order to consider this a valid explanation.   
Study Limitations      
Participants receiving verbal repetition rated their cognitive defusion rationale as 
significantly more credible, in comparison with imaginal exposure participants who 
viewed a habituation rationale. It could be argued that had the habituation rationale been 
perceived more credibly, comparable reductions would have been observed immediately 
following imaginal exposure. However, even after contr lling for participants’ credibility 
ratings, verbal repetition remained significantly more effective than imaginal exposure in 
immediately reducing the belief, distress, and meaningfulness appraisals associated with 
contamination-related thoughts, with the exception of the ratings of distress and 
meaningfulness for contamination-related thought #3. In addition, the verbal repetition 
and imaginal exposure credibility ratings were not significantly correlated with 
reductions in belief, distress, or meaningfulness at either post-intervention or follow-up 
(average r = -.07), which suggests that the differences betwen verbal repetition and 
imaginal exposure were due to factors other than the differences in perceived credibility 
of the interventions.   
It could also be argued that the intervention exercis  shown in the cognitive 
defusion rationale (the milk, milk, milk exercise) and the exercise shown in the imaginal 
exposure rationale (imagining a scary dog barking) were not of an equivalent emotional 
valence. Specifically, the imagining of a scary dog may be more anxiety-provoking than 
the verbal repetition of the word “milk”. However, as the purpose of showing each 
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exercise in the rationales was to give a demonstration of the actual technique and explain 
its purpose, it did not seem plausible to have the actor in the imaginal exposure rationale 
imagine a non-distressing scene. It is also likely that had a less aversive exercise been 
used, the imaginal exposure intervention rationale would have been rated by participants 
as even less credible. In an attempt to replicate the procedures used in Masuda et al.’s 
(2004) study of verbal repetition, the milk, milk, milk exercise was included in the present 
study as the example to demonstrate the technique, inst ad of replacing it with a 
potentially more aversive word. 
The current sample consisted of undergraduate students s lected based on clinical 
levels of contamination-related OCD symptoms. There is the potential for a lack of 
generalization of results to individuals with a diagnosis of OCD. However, participants’ 
PI-WSUR contamination subscale scores at the initial selection were approximately one 
standard deviation greater than those observed in the sample of individuals diagnosed 
with OCD reported by Burns et al. (1996), evidence that they are reporting significant 
concern with contamination-related obsessive-compulsive symptoms. As such, the rapid 
verbal repetition of contamination-related thoughts, presented with a cognitive defusion 
rationale, may be an effective addition to existing psychological approaches for treating 
OCD. In addition, participants receiving verbal repetition rated the cognitive defusion 
rationale as more credible than participants receiving the imaginal exposure rationale. 
This suggests that individuals with OCD may be more readily accepting of a cognitive 
defusion rationale than a treatment rationale that requires people to mentally elaborate a 
stimulus they fear.  
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There was an overrepresentation of women in the current sample, which is not 
atypical of an undergraduate psychology class. Althoug  a more balanced sample would 
have been desirable, there is no reason to expect that these findings would not generalize 
well to men.  
Through an accident of random assignment, in comparison with the imaginal 
exposure group, the verbal repetition group reported significantly lower pre-CMDT 
(baseline) ratings of distress for the first identified contamination-related thought, as well 
as lower pre-CMDT ratings of belief, distress, and meaningfulness for the 
“contamination” thought. However, there were no other significant differences between 
groups in baseline ratings of belief, distress, or meaningfulness, which suggests that the 
reductions observed following verbal repetition were due to the intervention, rather than 
simply being due to a less negative initial appraisal of the contamination-related thoughts.    
Caution must be taken when attempting to determine the therapeutic benefit of 
verbal repetition, based on the present results. An examination of the change in appraisal 
ratings, from the initial ratings at pre-CMDT to the final ratings at one-week follow-up, 
reveals a significant reduction following verbal repetition for only five of nine appraisal 
ratings. There was an 11% decrease in belief ratings for contamination-related thought 
#1; a 9% decrease in belief, a 24% decrease in distress, and an 18% decrease in 
meaningfulness ratings for thought #2; and a 15% decrease in meaningfulness ratings for 
thought #3. An examination of the change in appraisals following imaginal exposure 
reveals a significant reduction in appraisal ratings for four of nine ratings. For thought #1, 
there was a 23% decrease in ratings of distress; for thought #2, there was a 9% decrease 
in belief ratings; and for thought #3, there was an 11% decrease in belief and a 14% 
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decrease in distress ratings. As such, at one-week follow-up, the overall change in 
appraisal ratings following verbal repetition was firly similar to the change following 
imaginal exposure.  
An examination of the change in appraisal ratings for the “contamination” thought 
from pre-CMDT to follow-up, revealed no significant reductions in belief and distress, 
and a 15% reduction in meaningfulness ratings, following verbal repetition. One 
explanation for the lack of significant reductions i  belief and distress ratings is that 
while the word “contamination” was repeated many times by the verbal repetition group 
during the CMDT, this practice was not explicitly linked with the cognitive defusion 
rationale, which participants did not view until after the CMDT was completed. This is 
further evidence to suggest that the cognitive defusion rationale and the verbal repetition 
exercise needs to be connected in order for benefits to occur. It also raises the possibility 
that extended practice of verbal repetition may not result in commensurate reductions in 
appraisal ratings. The extent to which extended practice and/or daily use of verbal 
repetition over a period of time leads to further reductions in appraisals of anxiety-
provoking thoughts is an important area for future investigations. 
Following the extended use of imaginal exposure for the “contamination” thought 
during the CMDT, significant reductions in the belief (10 %), distress (15 %), and 
meaningfulness (12%) ratings were observed at follow-up. These results are consistent 
with a substantial body of research demonstrating the benefits of extended exposure on 
reducing the distress associated with anxious thougts (e.g., Foa et al., 1998). The 
significant reductions in belief and meaningfulness appraisals were unexpected, but are 
consistent with the previous finding that repeated exposure, in the absence of any direct 
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cognitive intervention, promotes a change in beliefs towards obsessive thoughts (Ito et 
al., 1995; Whittal et al., 2005). 
It might be argued that the significant reductions in meaningfulness that were 
observed immediately following verbal repetition were simply due to demand 
characteristics, as the cognitive defusion rationale explicitly stated that through rapid 
repetition of a word, that word will temporarily lose its meaning. However, the imaginal 
exposure rationale explicitly stated that thoughts can become less distressing through 
thinking about them, yet participants did not report any significant decrease in distress 
immediately following imaginal exposure. In addition, for the verbal repetition group, 
similar reductions were observed for appraisals of belief and distress immediately 
following verbal repetition, and these dimensions of change were not discussed in the 
cognitive defusion rationale. 
It is unknown how well the reductions in appraisals of contamination-related 
thoughts following the verbal repetition interventio  would generalize to the cognitions 
associated with other types of emotional disorders ( .g., worrisome thinking associated 
with generalized anxiety disorder, catastrophic misinterpretations associated with panic 
disorder, intrusive thoughts associated with post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive 
thoughts associated with other clinical subtypes of OCD, and depressive rumination 
associated with major depressive disorder). It is conceivable that certain thoughts (e.g., 
the vague worrying characteristic of generalized anxiety disorder) would be difficult to 
succinctly summarize in a short word or phrase that can be repeated out loud. An inability 
to accurately summarize negative cognitions in one or two short words or phrases could 
limit the potential clinical utility of this intervention for these individuals. However, for 
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problems associated with specific and identifiable thoughts (e.g., a major depression 
characterized by specific negative beliefs about the self, such as “I am ugly”, or a specific 
phobia of the number “thirteen”), the verbal repetition intervention may be useful in 
promoting a reappraisal of these negative cognitions. In addition, the cognitive defusion 
rationale used in the present study, with its emphasis on shifting the context of thinking 
towards viewing anxiety-provoking thoughts as ju t thoughts that do not need to be 
eliminated or controlled, is consistent with recent acceptance-based approaches to the 
treatment of anxiety disorders (for a review, see Orsillo, Roemer, Lerner, & Tull, 2004).  
Unfortunately, due to problems by participants in following the instructions 
during the completion of the Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory, there were no data 
available to examine the more general changes in metacognitive beliefs following verbal 
repetition and imaginal exposure. This will be an interesting and important area to study 
in future investigations of verbal repetition, as it is possible that verbal repetition, with its 
explicit metacognitive emphasis, may have a lasting beneficial impact on the way in 
which individuals view their negative thoughts.  
Although there was a tendency for verbal repetition participants’ semantic 
satiation scores and appraisal ratings to be associated in the hypothesized negative 
direction, the correlations were, for the most part, no  statistically significant (at post-
intervention, average r = -.14; at follow-up, average r = -.28). It is possible that an effect 
between variables does exist, but that either the sample size was not large enough to 
detect the effect, or that there were too few novel “contamination” and “automobile” 
items presented, resulting in too much variability for the mean differences in RTs to be 
statistically significant. It is expected that an increased sample size and the inclusion of 
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more CMDT stimuli would have been necessary to better ascertain the relation between 
semantic satiation and changes in appraisals of contami ation-related thoughts following 
verbal repetition. 
Directions for Future Research 
Follow-up research should replicate and elaborate on the present findings by 
assessing factors such as the extent to which verbal repetition, compared to imaginal 
exposure, leads to changes in daily contamination-relevant routines and avoidance 
behaviours. In addition, it will be interesting to determine whether the daily practice of 
verbal repetition and/or imaginal exposure results in further reductions in the 
believability, distress, and meaningfulness associated with contamination-related 
thoughts. This will be an important comparison, given the extensive research supporting 
the positive effects of repeated exposure-based practice (for a review, see Foa, Franklin, 
& Kozak, 1998). It is expected that with repeated imaginal exposure practice, ratings of 
distress associated with contamination-related thoug ts would show a linear decrease, 
whereas it is unknown if the repeated practice of verbal repetition would further reduce 
the associated distress. In addition, it is not know  what effects, if any, repeated verbal 
repetition or imaginal exposure practice would have on the reappraisal of the belief and 
meaningfulness associated with contamination-related thoughts. 
  In the present study, participants who received vrbal repetition experienced 
immediate reductions in the belief, distress, and meaningfulness associated with their 
contamination-related thoughts. Future studies should seek to determine if the addition of 
verbal repetition to the CBT and exposure and respon e prevention treatment of OCD 
will promote an increase in treatment outcomes, as well as an increase in compliance 
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rates in individuals who are resistant to complying with standard exposure and response 
prevention instructions. The use of the verbal repetition intervention could be a way for 
individuals to view their obsessive thoughts less meaningfully, and promote an 
experience of the thoughts as being “just thoughts” (Hayes et al., 1999). It has been 
suggested that interventions that promote a reappraisal of the beliefs held towards 
obsessive thoughts and that promote reductions in the meaningfulness of obsessive 
thoughts may improve treatment outcomes (Salkovskis, 1985; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997), 
and decrease exposure and response prevention treatment refusal and dropout (Purdon, in 
press). As such, it would be interesting to study the effects of adding verbal repetition as 
an adjunct to existing exposure and response prevention and CBT treatments for OCD.  
There has been a recent proliferation of “third wave” CBT interventions such as 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, all of which have n explicit emphasis on 
metacognition (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Linehan, 1993; Marlatt, 2002; Segal et al., 2002; 
Wells, 2000). Advancements in cognitive theories of OCD (e.g., Clark, 2004; Purdon and 
Clark, 1999), as well as the results of a recent uncontrolled clinical trial of Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy for the treatment of OCD (Twohig et al., 2006), suggest that 
interventions which teach individuals with OCD to exp rience obsessive thoughts in a 
detached context (i.e., experiencing an obsessive thought as “just another thought” that 
does not need to be acted on) are promising modifications to existing habituation-focused 
exposure and response prevention and CBT treatments for OCD.  
For the verbal repetition group, from post-interventio  to follow-up there was a 
significant increase in the belief and distress ratings for one of the contamination-related 
thoughts. It would be interesting to know if a mid-week “booster session” of verbal 
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repetition would have prevented this small increase and maintained the significant 
reductions observed at post-intervention. 
There were a number of significant decreases in appraisal ratings at follow-up for 
the imaginal exposure group. Although there were no immediate reductions following the 
imaginal exposure intervention, it is possible that immediate reductions in appraisal 
ratings would have been observed had the period of imaginal exposure practice been 
extended beyond 30 seconds, given the well-established benefits of extended exposure-
based practices.  
Another potential direction for future research is to examine positive affectivity 
following the use of verbal repetition. During the v rbal repetition intervention, it was 
observed that a number of participants began to smile and/or laugh while completing the 
rapid verbal repetition of contamination-related words, as they noticed how the word is 
perceived differently (e.g., “urine” begins to sound like “you’re in” during rapid 
repetition of the word). Although no formal data was collected to support this 
observation, these displays of positive emotion were not observed in the imaginal 
exposure participants while they were engaged in imag nal exposure of their 
contamination-related thoughts. In the recent uncontrolled study of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy for the treatment of OCD (Twohig et al., 2006), all participants 
found it to be a highly acceptable therapeutic approach. It would be interesting to more 
formally examine whether Acceptance and Commitment Therapy-based interventions 
such as cognitive defusion techniques are more palatable, more likely to promote positive 
emotions, and more likely to be used by individuals with OCD than are exposure and 
response prevention interventions.  
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An intriguing finding was that whereas no immediate eff ct was observed 
following imaginal exposure, significant reductions were observed one week following 
the intervention. This finding highlights the importance of conducting follow-up 
assessments when studying the effects of exposure-bas d treatments. Otherwise, a lack of 
immediate treatment effects may be considered inaccur tely as evidence of a lack of 
clinical utility, and potentially efficacious treatments may be wrongly dismissed as 
ineffective. 
If the results of the present study are replicated n  future studies find verbal 
repetition to be an effective adjunct to existing psychological treatment of OCD, it will be 
useful to determine the possible predictors of a positive response to the verbal repetition 
intervention. The present results suggest that the credibility ratings of the cognitive 
defusion rationale were overall, not predictive of outcome, although they were significant 
predictors for two of the nine between-group comparisons of reductions in appraisals. 
Noteworthy is the fact that the credibility ratings in the present study were made 
immediately after watching the video, but prior to the actual implementation of the verbal 
repetition technique. As such, it is possible that a significant relation between credibility 
ratings and outcome could exist between the two variables. It is a reasonable to 
hypothesize that participants who experience an immediate reduction in belief, distress, 
and meaningfulness appraisals will rate the rationale credibility higher than participants 
who experience no reduction; this is a question for future research to address. 
Conclusion 
 The verbal repetition of thoughts is a cognitive defusion technique used in 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy to help clients distance themselves from the literal 
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content of their thoughts, so they can be viewed in a detached context. In the present 
study, verbal repetition plus a cognitive defusion rationale was significantly more 
effective then either brief imaginal exposure plus a habituation rationale, or no 
intervention, in the immediate reductions of belief, distress, and meaningfulness 
associated with contamination-related thoughts. As such, the verbal repetition of thoughts 
might be an interesting adjunct to existing psychological treatments for obsessive-
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Seventeen of the 93 participants (18.3%) did not complete the Interpretations of 
Intrusions Inventory at initial selection. Another participant (1.1%) completed the 
Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory at initial selection, but did not report any intrusive 
thoughts. Eight participants (8.6%) reported thoughts for which it was unclear if it was an 
intrusive thought or an actual event which they were identifying (e.g., “my grandmother’s 
funeral”). Six participants (6.5%) identified thoughts which were either worries about the 
future or negative thoughts about the past (e.g., “I will disappoint my parents”, “I failed a 
course”), instead of intrusive thoughts. The identified thoughts from four other 
participants (4.3%) were not considered interpretabl  (e.g., “dislike of sharing food”). In 
total, data from 36 participants (38.7%) had to be excluded. In addition to these reporting 
problems, following the completion of the Interpretations of Intrusions Inventory in the 
laboratory, six participants informed the experimenter that they were unsure if they 
completed the questionnaire properly, as they made different interpretations for each of 
the two thoughts they identified. Unfortunately, due to these myriad problems, the 
remaining data from this self-report measure was not considered to be suitable to address 
the questions of interest, and this data was not analyzed or reported. 
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Appendix A: Identification of Contamination-Related Thoughts 
 
Please read over the list of “contamination” words and rank, in order, the three words that 
you find to be most distressing (e.g., germs #1, urine # 2, bacteria #3).    
 
       
bacteria _____         
blood   _____       
disease  _____ 
excrement _____ 
germs  _____          
infection _____         
saliva  _____ 
urine  _____ 




For each of the three words you have identified, please write down, in one brief sentence, 
a distressing thought you experience that involves th  word. 
 
 











Appendix B: Identification of Automobile-Related Thoughts 
 
Please read over the list of “automobile” words andrank, in order, the three automobiles 
that you find to be most familiar (e.g., mazda #1, chevrolet #2, toyota #3). 
 
 
buick  _____ 
chevrolet _____ 
chrysler _____ 
dodge  _____ 
ford  _____ 
honda  _____ 
mazda  _____ 
pontiac _____ 




For each of the three words you have identified, please write down, in one brief sentence, 
a thought you may experience that involves the word. 
 
 
























   
 











   
 











   
 
Not at all meaningful  Very meaningful 
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Appendix D: CMDT Neutral Category Names and Target Words  
 
 
Category       Member Target           Category     Nonmember Target 
 
  
TIME   minute    GEM   horse 
METAL  gold    ANIMAL  cotton 
DOG   poodle    CLOTH  oil 
CRIME  murder    FUEL   scotch 
WEAPON  gun    LIQUOR  apple 
SPORT  hockey    FRUIT   rain 
MUSIC  jazz    WEATHER  robin 
COLOUR  blue    BIRD   doll 
DANCE  disco    TOY   spider 
FLOWER  rose    FISH   halifax 
TREE   maple    CITY   cactus 
SNAKE  cobra    PLANT  russia 
DRUG   heroin    COUNTRY  dollar 
FOOD   bread    MONEY  candy 
TOOL   hammer   SNACK  water 
SPICE   pepper    DRINK  lobster 
GAME  chess    SEAFOOD  love 
MONTH           april    EMOTION  diamond 
VEHICLE  truck    SPICE   sofa 
APPLIANCE  stove    EXERCISE  rail 
BOOK   novel    DESSERT  foot 















   
 









Scientist (S): As a species, language, including thoug ts and words, gives us the 
blessings and the curse of knowledge. The power of language has pros and 
cons: there is a “light side” and a “dark side”. Onthe positive side, we can 
influence the environment and create a comfortable life. Just look around in 
this room. Lights, chairs, central heating, and the clothes we are wearing… 
Without language and our thoughts, which we call logical thinking, these 
would not be here.  On the dark side, however, we are the only species that 
worries. In the extreme case, we are the only species that commits suicide. 
     The dark side becomes dominant when we believe that our thoughts are 
literally what they say they are.  And we tend to think of our thoughts, of what 
they say, as the reality or as the criteria of the reality.  For example, you are 
what your thoughts say who you are, what you are, and how you are. However, 
are you really what your thoughts say you are? 
      What if I say that thoughts are simply what they are – thoughts are just 
thoughts – rather than what they say they are.  It might be difficult to get this 
point, so let’s do a sort of silly exercise. 
     As I say, this exercise sounds silly. I’m going to ask you to say a word. 
Then you tell me what comes to mind. I want you to say the word, “Milk”. 
 
Actor (A): Milk. 
S: Good. Now tell me what comes to mind when you said it? 
A: I have milk at home in the refrigerator. 
S: O.K. what else? What shows up when we say “Milk”? 
A: I picture it---white, a glass. 
S: Good what else? Can you taste it?. Can you feel what it feels like to drink a 
glass of milk? Cold, creamy, coats your mouth…right? 
S: O.K. let’s see if this fits. What came across your mind was things about actual 
milk and your experience with it. All that happened is that we made a strange 
sound — Milk. say it slowly! --- and lots of those things show up. Notice that 
there isn’t any milk in this room, not at all. But milk was in the room 
psychologically. You and I were seeing it, tasting it, and feeling it. And yet, 
only the word was actually here. 
S: Now, here is another exercise. The exercise is a little silly, and you might feel 
embarrassed doing it, but I am going to do it with you so we can all be silly 
together. What I am going to ask you to do is to say the word, “milk,” out loud, 
over-and-over again, and as rapidly as possible, and then notice what happens. 
Are you ready? 
S: O.K., Let’s do it. Say “milk” over and over again.  
S: (after 30 seconds) O.K. now stop. Tell me what came to mind while you kept 
repeating it? 
A: Gone, it sounds funny, it was just a sound. 
 98 
S: Did you notice what happened to the psychological aspects of milk that were 
here a few minutes ago? 
A: It seems to just go away. 
S: Right. When you said it the first time, it was as if milk was actually here, in the 
room. But all that really happened was that you just said that word. The first 
time you said it, it was more than just a word, andit was almost solid. But 
when you said it again and again and again, you began to lose that meaning 
and the words became just a sound.  
What I am suggesting is that, as you repeat scary or anxiety-provoking 
thoughts, your mind begins to see the thoughts as noise. What happens in this 
exercise may be applied to our negative thoughts. When you think about 
things, in addition to any meaning behind those words, isn’t it also true that 
these thoughts are just thoughts. The thoughts are just smoke, there isn't 
anything solid in them. 
 
 
Verbal Repetition Intervention 
Experimenter (E): Now, your task here is to say the word "XXX”, out loud, over 
and over again, as rapidly as possible until I say " top". Do you have any 
questions?  
Participant: (the participant may or may not ask questions about the procedure) 
E:O. K., are you ready? Now, begin (Experimenter may repeat the thought with 
the participant initially to prompt him or her to fllow the protocol). 
(wait 30 seconds) 
E: Stop! Please answer the following questions (the experimenter gives the 
participant a rating sheet). 
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Scientist (S): Have you ever visited friends who live on a really busy street or 
near an airport?  You’ve probably wondered how in the world they can stand 
the noise.  But your friends seem hardly to notice i .  Or have you ever 
squeezed into a tight pair of shoes or jeans in the morning, only to find that a 
little later you’ve forgotten you have them on?  If you’ve had either of these 
experiences, you’ve witnessed your body’s process of “habituation” firsthand.  
Habituation, which comes from the Latin word habitus, for “habit”, means “to 
accustom; to make familiar by frequent use or practice”.  In other words, after 
a familiarity with something that at first produces a trong physical or 
emotional reaction, we learn to get used to it and can ignore it.   
      Imagining in detail a scary thought may help you to think about 
uncomfortable, fear-provoking things so that they bcome less disturbing and 
meaningful. What if I say that thoughts can become less fearful and distressing 
if you just continue to experience them?  In time, anxiety-provoking thoughts 
are likely to lessen in intensity as you concentrate on them, because you can 
get used to the initially fearful thoughts and become used to it so the “volume 
gets turned down”.  
 
S: Let’s practice imaginal exposure.  I would like you to think of a scary situation, 
in particular, a mean-looking dog that is barking at you, and think about it in 
vivid detail.  Think of the scariest type of dog you know of, and imagine it with 
its teeth showing, barking really loudly at you.  Imagine it as vividly as if you 
were watching yourself and the dog in a scene from a ovie, frame by frame. 
S: (After 30 seconds) O.K. now stop. Tell me what happened as you imagined the 
scene? 
Actor (A): It seemed somewhat scary at first, but then it didn’t bother me as much 
by the end. 
S: Right. When you started to think about it, it was as if the barking dog was 
actually here, in the room. But all that really happened was that you just 
thought about that scene.  But the more you think about it, the more your mind 
gets used to the image.  
S: What I am suggesting is that, as you imagine a scary or anxiety-provoking 
scene, your mind gets used to the image and it becom s less distressing. It is 
like when you first put on those tight shoes, they urt for a bit, but then you 
begin not to notice them.  What happens in this exercis  may be applied to our 
negative thoughts. When you think about distressing things, by concentrating 
on them for long enough, you become used to the thoug t and is doesn’t seem 






Imaginal Exposure Intervention 
Experimenter (E): Now, your task here is to imagine a detailed scene involving 
the thought "XXX”, and concentrate on it until I say stop.  Do you have any 
questions?  
Participant: (the participant may or may not ask questions about the procedure) 
E:O. K., are you ready? Now, begin. 
(wait 30 seconds) 
E: Stop! Please answer the following questions (the experimenter gives the 
participant a rating sheet). 
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      Not at all credible  Very credible 
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Appendix I: Amount of Intervention Use 
 
 
Did you use your intervention during the week? 
 













   
 
                Not at all                 All the Time 
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Appendix J: Results for Contamination-Related Thought #2 
 
Appraisals of Identified Contamination-Related Thought #2 (Table 4) 
 
Belief Ratings (Figure D): There were no differences between groups in their 
belief ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-interventio  (all Fs < 2.35, ps > .12). There was 
a main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 7.46, p < .001, MSE = 138.77, which was qualified by a 
significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 2.17, p < .05, MSE = 138.77. Planned 
comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a signifcant decrease in belief ratings from 
pre-CMDT to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 12.34, p = .001, MSE = 166.42; from pre-
intervention to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 23.76, p < .001, MSE = 135.78; from pre-
CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 4.14, p < .05, MSE = 169.18; and from pre-intervention 
to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 11.24, p = .001, MSE = 128.17. Planned comparisons for 
imaginal exposure revealed a significant decrease in rat ngs from pre-CMDT to follow-
up, F (1, 85) = 5.26, p < .05, MSE = 169.18; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 
85) = 8.19, p < .01, MSE = 128.17. There was also a trend towards a decrease in ratings 
from post-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 2.96, p = .09, MSE = 166.84. 
 
Distress Ratings (Figure E): There were no differences between groups in their 
distress ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-intervention (all Fs < 1.91, ps > .16). There 
was an overall main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 6.85, p < .001, MSE = 236.44, in the 
reduction of distress, which was qualified by a signif cant time by group interaction, F (3, 
83) = 3.00, p = .01, MSE = 236.44. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a 
significant decrease in distress ratings from pre-CMDT to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 
21.33, p < .001, MSE = 271.04; from pre-intervention to post-interventio , F (1, 85) = 
28.04, p < .001, MSE = 183.75; from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 10.04, p < .01, 
MSE = 369.97; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 13.41, p < .001, MSE 
= 239.58. For imaginal exposure, there was a trend towards an increase in distress ratings 
from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 3.34, p = .07, MSE = 152.73; and a 
significant decrease in ratings from pre-interventio  to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 4.81, p < 
.05, MSE = 239.58. 
 
Meaningfulness Ratings (Figure F): There were no differences between groups in 
their meaningfulness ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-intervention (all Fs < 1.21, ps > 
.26). There was an overall main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 8.51, p < .001, MSE = 155.04, 
which was qualified by a significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 4.08, p = .001, 
MSE = 155.04. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a significant increase 
in meaningfulness ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 5.85, p < .05, 
MSE = 83.36. There was a significant decrease in ratings from pre-CMDT to post-
intervention, F (1, 85) = 10.87, p = .001, MSE = 167.94; from pre-intervention to post-
intervention, F (1, 85) = 34.96, p < .001, MSE = 120.14; from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F
(1, 85) = 6.75, p < .05, MSE = 206.31; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 
21.32, p < .001, MSE = 165.42. For imaginal exposure, there was a significa t increase in 
ratings from pre-CMDT to pre-intervention, F (1, 85) = 5.05, p < .05, MSE = 83.36; and a 
significant decrease in ratings from pre-interventio  to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 5.52, p < 




To determine if there were significant differences b tween intervention groups in 
terms of the immediate change in appraisal ratings for contamination-related thought #2  
following intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 
(group; Verbal Repetition, Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for the belief, distress, and meaningfulness appraisal ratings. Each of the main 
effects of time (Fs > 13.56, ps < .01), as well as the time by group interactions (Fs > 6.55, 
ps < .05) were significant, indicating that verbal repetition was significantly more 
effective than imaginal exposure in the immediate reappraisal of the thought. In addition, 
a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-up) x 2 (group; Verbal Repetition, Imaginal 
Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the appraisal ratings for 
contamination-related thought #2, to determine if there were significant differences in the 
change in ratings from baseline to follow-up following verbal repetition and imaginal 
exposure. For the belief, distress, and meaningfulness ratings, there were significant main 
effects of time, (Fs > 4.16, ps < .05), but the time by group interactions (F < 2.90, ps > 
.09) were not significant, suggesting no differences b tween the intervention groups in 
their respective abilities to reduce the appraisals of contamination-related thought #2. 
 
To determine if there were differences between verbal repetition and no 
intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the belief, 
distress, and meaningfulness ratings. Each of the main effects of time (Fs > 11.39, ps < 
.01), as well as each of the time by group interactions (Fs > 8.33, ps < .01) were 
significant. In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-up) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the 
appraisal ratings, to determine if there were significant differences in the change in 
ratings from baseline to follow-up following verbal repetition and no intervention. For 
the belief ratings, there was a trend towards a main effect of time, F (1, 56) = 3.42, p = 
.07, MSE = 145.74, but no time by group interaction, F (1, 56) = 1.43, p = .24, MSE = 
145.74, suggesting no differences between groups in the r respective abilities to reduce 
the belief in the contamination-related thought. However, for the distress and 
meaningfulness ratings, there were significant main effects of time (Fs > 4.92, ps < .05), 
as well as significant time by group interactions (F < 5.63, ps < .05), indicating that 
verbal repetition was more effective than no intervention in the reduction of these 
appraisals. 
 
To determine if there were differences between imagnal exposure and no 
intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Imaginal 
Exposure, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were also conducted for the 
belief, distress and meaningfulness ratings. None of the main effects of time (Fs < 2.61, 
ps > .11), or the time by group interactions (F  < 1.11, ps > .30) were significant, 
indicating that imaginal exposure and no intervention were equally ineffective in the 
immediate reappraisal of the thought. In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-
up) x 2 (group; Imaginal Exposure, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for the appraisal ratings, to determine if there to determine if there were 
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significant differences in the change in ratings from baseline to one-week follow-up 
following imaginal exposure and no intervention. None of the main effects of time (Fs < 
3.10, ps > .09), or the time by group interactions (F  < 1.41, ps > .23) were significant.  
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Appendix K: Results for Contamination-Related Thought #3 
 
Appraisals of Identified Contamination-Related Thought #3 (Table 5) 
Belief Ratings (Figure G): Five cases (verbal repetition n = 2; imaginal exposure n 
= 2; no intervention n = 1) were observed to have recorded an extremely low rating of 
belief associated with their third identified contamination-related thought at pre-
intervention. As such, they were eliminated from the analysis of belief ratings.   
There was a significant difference between groups in their belief ratings at pre-
CMDT, such that baseline no intervention ratings were lower than both verbal repetition, 
F (1, 80) = 3.97, p = .05, MSE = 319.60, and imaginal exposure, F (1, 80) = 8.69, p < .01, 
MSE = 319.60. There was also a significant difference between groups at pre-
intervention, such that no intervention ratings were lower than verbal repetition, F (1, 80) 
= 5.24, p < .05, MSE = 182.81, and imaginal exposure, F (1, 80) = 7.89, p < .01, MSE = 
182.81. There was an overall main effect of time, F (3, 78) = 11.00, p < .001, MSE = 
164.30, which was qualified by a significant time by group interaction, F (3, 78) = 3.93, p 
= .001, MSE = 164.30. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a significant 
decrease in belief ratings from pre-CMDT to post-intervention, F (1, 80) = 16.58, p < 
.001, MSE = 222.04; from pre-intervention to post-interventio , F (1, 80) = 41.69, p < 
.001, MSE = 122.60; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 80) = 7.83, p < .01, 
MSE = 141.32. In addition, there was a significant increase in belief ratings from post-
intervention to follow-up, F (1, 80) = 7.75, p < .01, MSE = 188.53. For imaginal 
exposure, there was a significant decrease in ratings from pre-CMDT to follow-up, F (1, 
80) = 6.16, p < .05, MSE = 225.62; from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 80) = 10.19, 
p < .01, MSE = 141.32; and there was a trend towards a decrease in ratings from post-
intervention to follow-up, F (1, 80) = 3.35, p = .07, MSE = 188.53.  
 
Distress Ratings (Figure H): There were no differences between groups in their 
distress ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-intervention (all Fs < 1.23, ps > .26). There 
was an overall main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 3.66, p < .05, MSE = 255.19, in the 
reduction of distress, which was qualified by a signif cant time by group interaction, F (3, 
83) = 2.59, p < .05, MSE = 255.19. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a 
significant decrease in distress ratings from pre-CMDT to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 
14.46, p < .001, MSE = 251.39; and from pre-intervention to post-intervention, F (1, 85) 
= 20.27, p < .001, MSE = 223.17. There was also a significant increase in distress ratings 
from post-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 5.61, p < .05, MSE = 312.12. For 
imaginal exposure, there was a significant decrease in ratings from pre-CMDT to follow-
up, F (1, 85) = 4.55, p < .05, MSE = 301.80; and from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 
85) = 6.40, p < .05, MSE = 311.84.  
 
Meaningfulness Ratings (Figure I): There were no differences between groups in 
their meaningfulness ratings at either pre-CMDT or pre-intervention (all Fs < 1.91, ps > 
.16). There was a main effect of time, F (3, 83) = 6.13, p = .001, MSE = 268.52, which 
was qualified by a significant time by group interaction, F (3, 83) = 2.34, p < .05, MSE = 
268.52. Planned comparisons for verbal repetition revealed a significant decrease in 
meaningfulness ratings from pre-CMDT to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 12.32, p = .001, 
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MSE = 309.20, and from pre-intervention to post-intervention, F (1, 85) = 22.37, p < 
.001, MSE = 206.96. There was also a trend towards a decrease from pre-CMDT to 
follow-up, F (1, 85) = 2.97, p = .09, MSE = 394.69; and a significant decrease in 
meaningfulness ratings from pre-intervention to follow-up, F (1, 85) = 6.64, p < .05, MSE 
= 247.38. For imaginal exposure, there was a significant decrease in ratings from pre-




To determine if there were significant differences b tween intervention groups in 
terms of the immediate change in appraisal ratings for contamination-related thought #3 
following intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 
(group; Verbal Repetition, Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for the belief, distress, and meaningfulness appraisal ratings. Each of the main 
effects of time (Fs > 12.13, ps < .01), as well as the time by group interactions (Fs > 4.30, 
ps < .05), were significant, indicating that verbal repetition was significantly more 
effective than imaginal exposure in the immediate reappraisal of the thought. 
In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-up) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, Imaginal Exposure) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the 
appraisal ratings for contamination-related thought #3, to determine if there to determine 
if there were significant differences in the change in ratings from baseline to one-week 
follow-up following verbal repetition and imaginal exposure. For the belief ratings, there 
was a significant main effect of time, F (1, 54) = 8.82, p < .01, MSE = 265.54, but no 
time by group interaction, F (1, 54) = 1.06, p = .31, MSE = 190.20, suggesting no 
differences between groups in their respective abilities to reduce the belief in 
contamination-related thought #3. For the distress atings, there was a trend towards a 
significant main effect of time, F (1, 58) = 3.87, p = .05, MSE = 398.16, but no time by 
group interaction, F (1, 58) = 0.43, p = .51, MSE = 398.16. For the meaningfulness 
ratings, there was also a trend towards a significat main effect of time, F (1, 58) = 3.20, 
p = .08, MSE = 475.31, but no time by group interaction, F (1, 58) = 0.19, p = .67, MSE = 
475.31. 
 
To determine if there were differences between verbal repetition and no 
intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the belief, 
distress and meaningfulness ratings. Each of the main effects of time (Fs > 12.50, ps < 
.01), as well as each of the time by group interactions (Fs > 8.21, ps < .01) were 
significant. In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-up) x 2 (group; Verbal 
Repetition, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for the 
appraisal ratings, to determine if there to determine if there were significant differences in 
the change in ratings from baseline to one-week follow-up following verbal repetition 
and no intervention. For the belief and distress ratings, there were no significant main 
effects of time (Fs < .58, ps > .44), or significant time by group interactions (F  < 2.14, 
ps > .14). For the meaningfulness ratings, while there was no main effect for time, F (1, 
56) = .56, p = .46, MSE = 308.93, there was a trend towards a significant time by group 
interaction, F (1, 56) = 3.82, p = .06, MSE = 308.93. 
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To determine if there were differences between imagnal exposure and no 
intervention, a series of 2 (time; Pre-intervention, Post-intervention) x 2 (group; Imaginal 
Exposure, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were also conducted for the 
belief, distress and meaningfulness ratings. None of the main effects of time (Fs < 3.01, 
ps > .08), or the time by group interactions (F  < .68, ps > .41) were significant, 
indicating that imaginal exposure and no intervention were equally ineffective in the 
immediate reappraisal of the thought. In addition, a series of 2 (time; Pre-CMDT, Follow-
up) x 2 (group; Imaginal Exposure, No Intervention) repeated measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for the appraisal ratings, to determine if there to determine if there were 
significant differences in the change in ratings from baseline to one-week follow-up 
following imaginal exposure and no intervention. For the belief ratings, there was a trend 
towards a significant main effect of time, F (1, 56) = 3.36, p = .07, MSE = 219.17, and a 
significant time by group interaction, F (1, 56) = 6.22, p < .05, MSE = 219.17. For the 
distress ratings, there was no main effect of time, F (1, 56) = 1.15, p = .29, MSE = 
309.56, but there was a trend towards a significant time by group interaction, F (1, 56) = 
3.45, p = .07, MSE = 309.56. For the meaningfulness ratings, neither t  main effect of 
time, F = .04, ps = .84, MSE = 396.96, nor the time by group interaction, F = 1.59, ps = 
.21, MSE = 396.96, were significant. 
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Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 


























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 

























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
























































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 



















































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 




















































Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 





















































Note. PI-WSUR COWC = Padua Inventory – Washington Sate University Revision 
Contamination Obsessions and Washing Compulsions; VR = erbal Repetition; IE = 





































Gender Distribution, Means and Standard Deviations f Age, PANAS scores,  
 
Credibility Ratings, and Amount of Intervention Practice 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure      VR                     IE                       CONT  
                     (n = 33)               (n = 30)                (n = 30)  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender   31 (2)   25 (5)   26 (4) 
 
Age    18.91 (1.33)  19.37 (1.16)  19.93 (2.43) 
 
PANAS Negative Affect 
     Pre-intervention   14.73 (4.59)  13.93 (5.02)  15.67 (5.70) 
     Follow-upa   15.10 (5.23)  13.63 (3.97)  15.61 (6.01) 
 
PANAS Positive Affect 
     Pre-intervention  26.39 (6.01)  26.90 (5.35)  27.90 (6.25) 
     Follow-upa   23.70 (6.59)  26.37 (7.74)  24.64 (6.88) 
 
Credibility of rationaleb 72.43 (15.43)  56.97 (25.05) 
 
Amount of practicec  40.43 (32.35)  30.63 (20.96) 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Note. a. VR n = 30; CONT n = 28. b. VR n = 30. c. VR n = 7, IE n = 8. PANAS = 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 





Relation between Pre-CMDT (Baseline) Ratings of Belief, Distress, and  
 




VAS Rating  Belief  Distress  
________________________________________ 
   
Thought #1 
 
Distress  .250*   
 





Distress  .486**   
 





Distress  .234*   
 



















Table 3  
 
Appraisal Ratings for Identified Contamination-Relat d Thought #1 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure      VR                     IE                       CONT  
                     (n = 30)               (n = 30)                (n = 28)  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
VAS Belief rating  
     Pre-CMDT   69.93 (24.37)  70.40 (29.64)  72.25 ( 4.64) 
     Pre-intervention  74.70 (22.89)  76.27 (25.34)  76.68 (22.86) 
     Post-intervention  63.90 (20.67)  76.73 (19.77)  75.75 (22.85) 
     Follow-up   62.00 (29.00)  68.93 (27.71)  71.25 ( 6.26) 
 
VAS Distress rating  
     Pre-CMDT   54.13 (26.86)  66.70 (20.06)  71.21 ( 3.21) 
     Pre-intervention  60.40 (26.25)  64.93 (26.86)  73.07 (23.18) 
     Post-intervention  44.77 (26.28)  68.63 (19.29)  69.14 (27.10) 
     Follow-up   48.77 (26.83)  51.27 (31.42)  65.29 ( 6.44) 
 
VAS Meaningfulness rating 
     Pre-CMDT   49.70 (30.65)  59.30 (31.65)  54.93 (26.60) 
     Pre-intervention  58.93 (30.21)  62.47 (26.58)  64.75 (23.37) 
     Post-intervention  43.43 (24.48)  63.73 (22.03)  59.75 (27.39) 
     Follow-up   49.33 (27.10)  55.77 (30.09)  59.39 (28.91)  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
CONT = No Intervention. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4  
 
Appraisal Ratings for Identified Contamination-Relat d Thought #2 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure      VR                     IE                       CONT  
                     (n = 30)               (n = 30)                (n = 28) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
VAS Belief rating  
     Pre-CMDT   73.47 (26.74)  81.77 (13.64)  77.68 (20.58) 
     Pre-intervention  76.43 (26.32)  82.43 (12.73)  79.86 (19.72) 
     Post-intervention  61.77 (27.03)  79.80 (18.34)  78.71 (18.35) 
     Follow-up   66.63 (29.53)  74.07 (25.36)  76.21 ( 2.36) 
 
VAS Distress rating  
     Pre-CMDT   66.57 (26.26)  62.73 (22.23)  71.36 (22.65) 
     Pre-intervention  65.47 (27.86)  68.57 (21.73)  70.39 (22.78) 
     Post-intervention  46.93 (27.64)  64.33 (22.74)  66.46 (25.18) 
     Follow-up   50.83 (29.37)  59.80 (29.89)  69.07 (24.97) 
 
VAS Meaningfulness rating 
     Pre-CMDT   54.80 (30.62)  60.97 (24.00)  62.36 (23.14) 
     Pre-intervention  60.50 (30.25)  66.27 (21.81)  61.29 (25.04) 
     Post-intervention  43.77 (25.77)  61.83 (24.93)  60.64 (24.88) 
     Follow-up   45.17 (28.34)  58.47 (27.01)  63.39 (25.53)  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; 
CONT = No Intervention. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 5  
 
Appraisal Ratings for Identified Contamination-Relat d Thought #3 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure      VR                     IE                       CONT  
                     (n = 30)               (n = 30)                (n = 28) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
VAS Belief ratinga  
     Pre-CMDT   82.68 (17.62)  87.29 (12.71)  73.07 (22.21) 
     Pre-intervention  85.57 (13.19)  87.46 (10.00)  77.22 (16.70) 
     Post-intervention  66.46 (24.08)  84.04 (11.58)  74.74 (18.32) 
     Follow-up   76.68 (21.29)  77.32 (21.52)  74.96 (19.43) 
 
VAS Distress rating  
     Pre-CMDT   61.03 (26.79)  67.37 (22.66)  67.82 (19.85) 
     Pre-intervention  62.83 (27.72)  69.33 (24.39)  69.50 (22.84) 
     Post-intervention  45.47 (26.98)  64.93 (23.48)  69.39 (23.71) 
     Follow-up   56.27 (30.77)  57.80 (28.90)  70.39 (21.31) 
 
VAS Meaningfulness rating 
     Pre-CMDT   57.70 (30.48)  62.63 (29.11)  57.96 (22.02) 
     Pre-intervention  59.33 (28.24)  67.90 (19.62)  60.86 (23.47) 
     Post-intervention  41.77 (23.51)  63.03 (26.25)  57.64 (22.51) 
     Follow-up   48.87 (30.05)  57.23 (27.25)  61.89 (25.28) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. a. VR n = 28, IE n = 28, CONT n = 27. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal 




Table 6  
 
Appraisal Ratings for “Contamination” Thought 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure      VR                     IE                       CONT  
                     (n = 30)               (n = 29)                (n = 27) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
VAS Belief ratinga  
     Pre-CMDT   69.03 (23.66)  82.14 (16.29)  74.81 (16.57) 
     Pre-intervention  75.63 (19.85)  83.76 (12.45)  77.08 (17.58)        
     Follow-up   67.00 (25.03)  73.59 (24.37)  73.23 (17.40)  
 
VAS Distress rating  
     Pre-CMDT   51.87 (27.73)  65.66 (20.58)  62.33 (2 .37) 
     Pre-intervention  58.33 (27.17)  67.10 (21.89)  64.93 (27.53)  
     Follow-up   46.57 (29.64)  55.55 (25.95)  63.19 (26.64) 
 
VAS Meaningfulness rating 
     Pre-CMDT   49.90 (27.16)  63.17 (22.41)  54.67 (24.12) 
     Pre-intervention  55.73 (27.00)  64.62 (19.79)  57.15 (26.43)  
     Follow-up   42.27 (28.55)  55.79 (24.86)  57.78 (26.48) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. a. CONT n = 26. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; VR = Verbal Repetition; IE = 





Table 7  
 
PI-WSUR Total Score and Subscale Scores at Initial Selection and Follow-Up 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure      VR                     IE                       CONT  




     Initial selection  49.17 (18.16)  54.13 (22.62)  57.46 (19.97) 
     Follow-up   48.90 (19.70)  54.93 (23.97)  60.18 (24.69) 
 
COWC score 
     Initial selection  19.93 (3.77)  22.37 (5.64)  21.29 (5.62) 
     Follow-up   18.90 (6.72)  20.53 (8.40)  23.36 (7.47) 
 
DGC score     
     Initial selection  2.80 (2.83)  3.33 (3.32)  4.00 (3.50)  
     Follow-up   2.43 (2.40)  3.93 (3.82)  4.14 (3.81) 
 
CC score 
     Initial selection  15.07 (9.43)  16.37 (9.17)  17.50 (7.86) 
     Follow-up   15.00 (8.84)  17.37 (10.77)  18.00 (9.67) 
 
OTHS score 
     Initial selection  7.20 (4.83)  7.17 (5.36)  10.36 (6.14) 
     Follow-up   7.63 (4.21)  7.50 (4.62)  10.36 (6.01) 
 
OIHS score 
     Initial selection  4.17 (5.07)  4.90 (6.38)  4.32 (5.61) 
     Follow-up   4.93 (6.38)  5.60 (5.36)  4.32 (5.36) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. COWC = Contamination Obsessions and Washing Compulsions; DGS = 
Dressing/Grooming Compulsions; CC = Checking Compulsions; OTHS = Obsessional 
Thoughts of Harm to Self/others; OIHS = Obsessional Impulses to Harm Self/others; VR 
= Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure; CONT = No Intervention. Standard 
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Table 8   
 
CMDT Mean Median Response Times (RTs) and Mean Percentage of Errors  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Condition     3 repetitions/Short Imagining         30 repetitions/Long Imagining        
     _________________________       ________________________  
 
    RT           % error                  RT       % error  
___________________________________________________________________ 
IE – neutrala 
 
     Member  766.02 (241.78) 5.2  868.18 (261.45)        10.0 
     Nonmember 852.83 (255.49) 6.5  945.30 (320.14) 5.4 
 
IE – “automobile”b 
 
     Member  704.13 (175.88) 5.0  810.78 (255.93) 6.7 
     Nonmember 812.58 (204.82) 3.3  868.01 (223.61) 6.7 
 
IE – “contamination”b 
 
     Member  813.49 (248.65) 6.9  864.38 (249.47) 6.9 
     Nonmember 867.85 (256.14) 4.2  945.15 (326.34) 5.8 
 
VR – neutralc 
 
     Member  690.38 (162.93)  1.9  732.16 (187.69) 1.3 
     Nonmember 759.55 (208.92) 5.5  782.79 (190.06) 4.0 
 
VR – “automobile”d 
 
     Member  681.90 (153.18) 4.0  712.57 (171.39) 2.0 
     Nonmember 733.02 (161.17) 2.5  803.67 (216.23) 1.8 
 
VR – “contamination”d 
 
     Member  757.38 (217.39) 4.3  796.95 (226.55) 5.1 




Note. a. n = 42; b. n = 40; c. n = 48; d. n = 44. RT values are in milliseconds. VR = 
Verbal Repetition; IE = Imaginal Exposure. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 9   
 
CMDT Mean Response Times (RTs) and Mean Percentage of Errors for  
 
“Contamination” and “Automobile” Conditions (No Repated Items)  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Condition     3 repetitions/Short Imagining         30 repetitions/Long Imagining        
     _________________________       ________________________  
 
    RT           % error                  RT       % error  
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
IE – “automobile”a 
 
     Member  828.11 (237.76) 5.8  890.99 (255.93)        12.5 
     Nonmember 863.02 (201.49) 5.0           1001.58 (298.69) 9.2 
 
IE – “contamination”b 
 
     Member  902.55 (304.75)         10.0          1004.84 (327.73)          10.8 
     Nonmember 949.20 (294.69) 5.8          1030.80 (298.66) 5.8 
 
VR – “automobile”c 
 
     Member  721.52 (167.83) 6.8  807.77 (209.42) 3.0 
     Nonmember 839.72 (231.29) 3.0  899.91 (270.77) 3.0 
 
VR – “contamination”d 
 
     Member  818.15 (261.55) 6.8  886.72 (258.76) 8.3 
     Nonmember 861.83 (243.42) 6.1  862.69 (235.17) 6.1 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. a. n = 39; b. n = 40; c. n = 43; d. n = 41. RT values are in milliseconds. VR = 




Relation between Verbal Repetition Semantic Satiation Scores for Neutral Items,  
 




VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 30)       (n = 26)     (n = 25) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Post-Intervention: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1      -.147         -.231          .023  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1      -.202         -.374*       .035  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1     -.207        -.294      -.033  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2       .117         -.196       .042  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2      -.041         -.310       .069  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2     -.117        -.078      -.006 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3       .415**         -.050       .008   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3      -.152         -.273       .006  
 




Note. *p < .10; **p < .05. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 
 




Relation between Verbal Repetition Semantic Satiation Scores for Neutral Items,  
 




VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 30)       (n = 26)     (n = 25) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Follow-Up: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1      -.120         -.195          .207  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1      -.360         -.391**       .259  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1     -.362**       -.361*       .256  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2       .103         -.335*       .231  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2      -.400**         -.426**       .210  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2     -.319*         -.276       .181 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3       .231         -.311       .199   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3      -.357*         -.528***       .325  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #3     -.380**       -.276       .137  
 
  Belief Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought      -.086         -.395**       .409** 
 
  Distress Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought      -.304         -.299       .295 
 
  Meaningfulness Rating  









Relation between Imaginal Exposure Semantic Satiation Scores for Neutral Items,  
 




VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 27)       (n = 24)     (n = 24) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Post-Intervention: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1      -.165           .063          .090  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1      -.060           .020       .350*  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1     -.287        .083       .212  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2        .011         -.064       .202  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2        .027          .186       .170  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2     -.167        .219       .111 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3      -.104         -.247       .209   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3        .103         -.065       .370*  
 




Note. *p < .10. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 
 




Relation between Imaginal Exposure Semantic Satiation Scores for Neutral Items,  
 




VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 27)       (n = 24)     (n = 24) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Follow-Up: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1       .024         -.278          .090  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1      -.031           .042       .211  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1      .027        -.046       .380  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2       .266          .090       .098  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2       .230          .310      -.008  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2      .133        .320       .024 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3       .128         -.083       .196   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3       .074          .079       .118  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #3     -.003        -.203       .235  
 
  Belief Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought      -.089         -.302       .079 
 
  Distress Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought      -.046         -.138       .106 
 
  Meaningfulness Rating  




Note. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale.
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 Table 14 
 
Relation between No Intervention – Verbal Repetition Semantic Satiation Scores for  
 





VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 14)       (n = 13)     (n = 13) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Post-Intervention: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1        .151           .162          .060  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1        .427           .248       .150  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1       .332        .247       .040  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2        .103           .426       .188  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2        .218           .082       .435  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2       .270        .113       .069 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3        .105           .361      -.016   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3      -.142           .645**       .067  
 




Note. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 




Relation between No Intervention – Verbal Repetition Semantic Satiation Scores for  
 





VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 14)       (n = 13)     (n = 13) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Follow-Up: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1       .352           .241          .014  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1       .439           .152       .156  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1      .381        .287       .081  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2       .358           .427       .185  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2       .125           .234       .354  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2      .270        .370       .294 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3       .088           .237       .030   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3       .076           .562**       .300  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #3      .057        .603**       .040  
 
  Belief Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought       .282          .651**     -.132 
 
  Distress Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought       .283          .374     -.060 
 
  Meaningfulness Rating  








Relation between No Intervention – Imaginal Exposure Semantic Satiation Scores for  
 





VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 13)       (n = 13)     (n = 13) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Post-Intervention: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1        .569**          -.211          .552**  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1        .008           .332       .246  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1       .091        .186       .305  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2        .397           .113       .469  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2        .010           .344       .279  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2      -.057        .327       .228 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3        .438          -.296       .600**   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3       -.054           .219       .388  
 




Note. *p < .10; **p < .05. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
 




Relation between No Intervention – Imaginal Exposure Semantic Satiation Scores for  
 





VAS Rating      SS Score      SS Score  SS Score 
       “neutral”   “automobile”        “contamination” 
        (n = 13)       (n = 13)     (n = 13) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
   
Follow-Up: 
  
  Belief Rating Thought #1       .253           .095          . 511*  
 
  Distress Rating Thought #1      -.214           .433       . 231  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #1      .011        .130       . 292  
 
  Belief Rating Thought #2       .088           .254       . 571**  
  
  Distress Rating Thought #2      -.090           .613**       .257  
  
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #2      .014        .502*       .137 
 
  Belief Rating Thought #3       .253          -.012       .497*   
  
  Distress Rating Thought #3      -.166           .769***       .019  
 
  Meaningfulness Rating Thought #3      .002        .070       .439  
 
  Belief Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought       .423          .199       .356 
 
  Distress Rating  
       “Contamination” Thought      -.010          .273       .219 
 
  Meaningfulness Rating  




Note. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale. 
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Table 18  
 
No Intervention – Verbal Repetition and No Intervention – Imaginal Exposure Appraisal  
 
Ratings for “Contamination” Thought 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent measure    CONT-VR               CONT-IE  
                         (n = 14)                (n = 13)                
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
VAS Belief ratinga  
     Pre-CMDT   72.69 (14.07)  76.92 (19.09)     
     Pre-intervention  74.54 (19.15)  79.62 (16.23)           
     Follow-up   71.62 (18.25)  74.85 (17.09)    
  
VAS Distress rating  
     Pre-CMDT   57.14 (25.51)  67.92 (20.32)     
     Pre-intervention  59.79 (28.89)  70.46 (25.96)     
     Follow-up   58.36 (28.07)  68.38 (25.04)     
 
VAS Meaningfulness rating 
     Pre-CMDT   50.64 (24.00)  59.00 (24.44)     
     Pre-intervention  52.07 (28.47)  62.62 (23.93)    
     Follow-up   54.57 (28.80)  61.23 (24.41)   
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. a. CONT-VR n = 13. VAS = Visual Analogue Scale; CONT-VR = Control 
subgroup receiving verbal repetition instructions; CONT-IE = Control subgroup 
receiving imaginal exposure instructions. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
